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ON THE LOGICAL COMPLEXITY OF CYCLIC ARITHMETIC
ANUPAM DAS
University of Birmingham, United Kindgdom
e-mail address: a.das@bham.ac.uk
Abstract. We study the logical complexity of proofs in cyclic arithmetic (CA), as intro-
duced by Simpson in [Sim17], in terms of quantifier alternations of formulae occurring.
Writing CΣn for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σn formulae, our
main result is that IΣn+1 and CΣn prove the same Πn+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0. Furthermore,
due to the ‘uniformity’ of our method, we also show that CA and Peano Arithmetic (PA)
proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size.
The inclusion IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn is obtained by proof theoretic techniques, relying on normal
forms and structural manipulations of PA proofs. It improves upon the natural result that
IΣn ⊆ CΣn. The converse inclusion, CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1, is obtained by calibrating the approach
of [Sim17] with recent results on the reverse mathematics of Bu¨chi’s theorem [KMPS19],
and carefully specialising to the case of cyclic proofs. These results improve upon the
bounds on proof complexity and logical complexity implicit in [Sim17] and [BT17b].
The uniformity of our method also allows us to recover a metamathematical account of
fragments of CA; in particular we show that, for n ≥ 0, the consistency of CΣn is provable
in IΣn+2 but not IΣn+1. As a result, we show that certain versions of McNaughton’s
theorem (the determinisation of ω-word automata) are not provable in RCA0, partially
resolving an open problem from [KMPS19].
1. Introduction
Cyclic and non-wellfounded proofs have been studied by a number of authors as an alternative
to proofs by induction. This includes cyclic systems for fragments of the modal µ-calculus,
e.g. [NW96, SD03, DHL06, DBHS16, Dou17, AL17], structural proof theory for logics with
fixed-points, e.g. [San02, FS13, For14, BDS16], (automated) proofs of program termination
in separation logic, e.g. [BBC08, BDP11, RB17] and, in particular, cyclic systems for first-
order logic with inductive definitions, e.g. [Bro05, Bro06, BS07, BS11]. Due to the somewhat
implicit nature of invariants they define, cyclic systems can be advantageous for metalogical
analysis, for instance offering better algorithms for proof search, e.g. [BGP12, DP17].
Cyclic proofs may be seen as more intuitively analogous to proofs by ‘infinite descent’
than proofs by induction (see, e.g., [Sim17]); this subtle difference is enough to make inductive
invariants rather hard to generate from cyclic proofs. Indeed it was recently shown that
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simulating cyclic proofs using induction is not possible for some sub-arithmetic languages
[BT17a], but becomes possible once arithmetic reasoning is available [Sim17, BT17b].
Cyclic arithmetic was proposed as a general subject of study by Simpson in [Sim17].
Working in the language of arithmetic, it replaces induction by non-wellfounded proofs
with a certain ‘fairness’ condition on the infinite branches. The advantage of this approach
to infinite proof theory as opposed to, say, infinite well-founded proofs via an ω-rule (see,
e.g., [Sch77]), is that it admits a notion of finite proofs: those that have only finitely many
distinct subproofs, and so may be represented by a finite (possibly cyclic) graph.
Cyclic arithmetic itself is to cyclic proofs what Peano arithmetic is to traditional proofs:
it provides a general framework in which many arguments can be interpreted and/or proved
in a uniform manner, and this is one reason why it is an interesting subject of study. This is
already clear from, say, the results of [BT17b], where the study of cyclic proofs for first-order
logic with inductive definitions relied on an underlying arithmetic framework. We elaborate
further on this in Sect. 10.
Contribution. In [Sim17], Simpson showed that Peano Arithmetic (PA) is able to simulate
cyclic reasoning by proving the soundness of the latter in the former. (The converse result
is obtained much more easily.) Nonetheless, several open questions remain from [Sim17],
concerning constructivity, normalisation, logical complexity and proof complexity for cyclic
and non-wellfounded proofs.
In this work we address the logical complexity and proof complexity of proofs in Cyclic
Arithmetic (CA), as compared to PA. Namely, we study how quantifier alternation of proofs
in one system compares to that in the other, and furthermore how the size of proofs compare.
Writing CΣn for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs containing only Σn formulae, we
show, for n ≥ 0:
(1) IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn over Πn+1 theorems (Sect. 4, Thm. 4.1).
(2) CA and PA proofs of the same theorem differ only exponentially in size (Sect. 6,
Thm. 6.10).
(3) CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1 over all theorems (Sect. 7, Thm. 7.3).
(1) is obtained by proof theoretic techniques, relying on normal forms and structural
manipulations of Peano Arithmetic proofs. It improves upon the natural result that IΣn ⊆
CΣn, although induces a non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs. (2) is obtained via a
certain ‘uniformisation’ of the approach of [Sim17]. In particular, by specialising the key
intermediate results to the case of cyclic proofs, we are able to extract small PA proofs of
some required properties of infinite word automata from analogous ones in ‘second-order’
(SO) arithmetic. Finally, (3) is obtained by calibrating the argument of (2) with recent
results on the reverse mathematics of Bu¨chi’s theorem [KMPS19], allowing us to bound the
logical complexity of proofs in the simulation. Together, these results almost completely
characterise the logical and proof complexity theoretic strength of cyclic proofs in arithmetic,
answering the questions (ii) and (iii), Sect. 7 of [Sim17].
After demonstrating these results, we give a metamathematical analysis of provability
in cyclic theories, in particular showing that the consistency of CΣn is provable in IΣn+2
but not IΣn+1, by appealing to a form of Go¨del incompleteness for cyclic theories. We also
use these observations to show that certain formulations of McNaughton’s theorem, that
every nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton has an equivalent deterministic parity (or Rabin,
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Muller, etc.) automaton, are not provable in the SO theory RCA0. This partially resolves
the question of the logical strength of McNaughton’s theorem left open in [KMPS19].
Structure of the paper. In Sects. 2 and 3 we introduce some preliminaries on Peano
Arithmetic, proof theory, cyclic proofs and automaton theory. In Sect. 4 we present (1) and
give an example of the translation in App. A. The contents of Sects. 2, 3 and 4 and App. A
are more-or-less self contained and should be accessible to the general proof theorist.
We briefly introduce some SO theories of arithmetic in Sect. 5 that are conservative over
the fragments of PA we need in order to conduct some of the intermediate arguments on
infinite word automata. In Sect. 6 we present (2), and in Sect. 7 we adapt the argument to
obtain (3). In Sect. 8 we give our metamathematical analysis of cyclic theories, and in Sect. 9
we explain their consequences for the logical strength of certain forms of McNaughton’s
theorem. We conclude with some further remarks and perspectives in Sect. 10, including a
comparison with the results of [Sim17] and [BT17b].
For Sects. 5, 6, 7 and 9 it would be helpful for the reader to have some background in
subsystems of second-order arithmetic (see e.g. [Sim09, Hir14]) and ω-automaton theory
(see e.g. [Tho97]). For Sect. 8 it would be helpful for the reader to have some background in
the metamathematics of first-order arithmetic (see e.g. [HP93]). Nonetheless we aim to give
sufficient details for the general proof theorist to appreciate all the content herein.
2. Preliminaries on first-order arithmetic proof theory
We present only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to consult, e.g., [Bus98] for
a more thorough introduction to first-order arithmetic.
We work in first-order (FO) logic with equality, =, with variables written x, y, z etc.,
terms written s, t, u etc., and formulae written ϕ,ψ etc., construed over the logical basis
{¬,∨,∧,∃,∀}. We will usually assume formulae are in De Morgan normal form, with
negation restricted to atomic formulae. Nonetheless, we may write ¬ϕ for the De Morgan
‘dual’ of ϕ, defined as follows:
¬¬ϕ := ϕ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
¬∀x.ϕ := ∃x.¬ϕ
¬∃x.ϕ := ∀x.¬ϕ
We also write ϕ ⊃ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ≡ ψ for (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ).
FO logic has equality ‘built-in’, i.e. we always assume the following axioms are present:
(eq1) ∀x.x = x.
(eq2) ∀~x, ~y.((x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk) ⊃ f(~x) = f(~y), for each k ∈ N and each function
symbol f of arity k.
(eq3) ∀x, y.(((x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xk = yk) ∧ P (~x)) ⊃ P (~y)), for each k ∈ N and each predicate
symbol P of arity k.
Following [Sim17], the language of arithmetic (with inequality) is formulated as {0, s,+,×, <
}, with their usual interpretations over N. A theory is a set T of closed formulae over this
language. We write T ` ϕ if ϕ is a logical consequence of T . We write T1 ⊆ T2 if T1 ` ϕ
implies T2 ` ϕ, and T1 = T2 if T1 ⊆ T2 and T2 ⊆ T1.
The theory of Robinson arithmetic (with inequality), written Q, is axiomatised by:
(Q1) ∀x.sx 6= 0.
(Q2) ∀x, y.(sx = sy ⊃ x = y).
(Q3) ∀x.(x 6= 0 ⊃ ∃y.x = sy).
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(Q4) ∀x. x+ 0 = x.
(Q5) ∀x, y. x+ sy = s(x+ y).
(Q6) ∀x. x · 0 = 0.
(Q7) ∀x, y. x · sy = x · y + x.
(Q8) ∀x, y.(x < y ≡ ∃z.(x+ sz = y))
Notice that, above and elsewhere, we may write · instead of × in terms, or even omit the
symbol altogether, and we assume it binds more strongly than +. We also write ∀x < t.ϕ
and ∃x < t.ϕ as abbreviations for ∀x.(x < t ⊃ ϕ) and ∃x.(x < t ∧ ϕ) resp. Formulae with
only such quantifiers are called bounded.
As usual, we may assume that Q is axiomatised by the universal closures of bounded
formulae. In particular the existential quantifiers in axioms (Q3) and (Q8) above may be
bounded by x and y resp., provably under quantifier-free induction. We will implicitly
assume this bounded axiomatisation for the sequent calculus formulation of arithmetic later.
Remark 2.1. Our basic axioms and, later, our inference rules differ slightly from those
in [Sim17], however it is routine to see that the theories PA and CA defined in this work
coincide with those of [Sim17]. In particular the axiomatisations are equivalent once even
open induction is present (this is weaker than any theory we will consider). We chose a
slightly different presentation so that we could readily apply certain metalogical results, such
as Thm. 2.5, with no intermediate proof manipulation.
Definition 2.2 (Arithmetical hierarchy). For n ≥ 0, we define:
• ∆0 = Π0 = Σ0 is the class of bounded formulae.
• Σn+1 is the class of formulae of the form ∃~x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Πn.
• Πn+1 is the class of formulae of the form ∀~x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Σn.
Notice in particular that, by definition of De Morgan normal form, if ϕ ∈ Σn then ¬ϕ ∈ Πn
and vice-versa. In practice we often consider these classes of formulae up to logical equivalence.
We say that a formula is in ∆n (in a theory T ) if it is equivalent (resp. provably equivalent
in T ) to both a Σn and Πn formula.
Definition 2.3 (Arithmetic). Peano Arithmetic (PA) is axiomatised by Q and the axiom
schema of induction:
(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x.(ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(sx))) ⊃ ∀x.ϕ(x) (2.1)
For a class of formulae Φ, we write Φ-IND for the set of induction axiom instances when
ϕ ∈ Φ in (2.1). We write IΦ for the theory Q + Φ-IND.
The following is a classical result:
Proposition 2.4 (See e.g. [Bus98, Kay91]). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn = IΠn.
2.1. A sequent calculus presentation of PA. We will work with a standard sequent
calculus presentation of FO logic, given in Fig. 1, where i ∈ {0, 1} and a, known as the
‘eigenvariable’, is fresh, i.e. does not occur free in the lower sequent. Two important
considerations are that we work with cedents as sets, i.e. there is no explicit need for
contraction rules, and that we have an explicit substitution rule. In the θ-sub rule the
‘substitution’ θ is a mapping from variables to terms, which is extended in the natural way
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id
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆, ϕ =1 Γ⇒ ∆, t = t =2 Γ, s1 = t1, . . . , sk = tk ⇒ ∆, f(~s) = f(~t)
¬-l
Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ ¬-r Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ,¬ϕ =3 Γ, s1 = t1, . . . , sk = tk, P (~s)⇒ ∆, P (~t)
Γ⇒ ∆
θ-sub
θ(Γ)⇒ θ(∆)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
cut
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
wk
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
∨-l
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕi ⇒ ∆∧-l
Γ, ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ[a/x]⇒ ∆
∃-l
Γ, ∃x.ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ[t/x]⇒ ∆
∀-l
Γ,∀x.ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
∧-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi∨-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[a/x]
∀-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀x.ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[t/x]
∃-r
Γ⇒ ∆,∃x.ϕ
Figure 1: The sequent calculus for FO logic with equality, where a occurs only as indicated
and i ∈ {0, 1}.
to cedents. Substitution is important for the definition of a cyclic arithmetic proof in the
next section, but does not change provability in usual proofs.
The sequent calculus for Q is obtained from the FO calculus in the language of arithmetic
by adding appropriate initial sequents for each instantiation of an axiom of Q by terms.
For theories extending Q by (at least quantifier-free) induction, we assume that these intial
sequents contain only ∆0 formulae by appropriately bounding the existential quantifiers.
The schema Φ-IND, for Φ closed under subformulas and substitution, is implemented in the
calculus by adding the induction rule,
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
ind
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
for formulae ϕ ∈ Φ. Here we require a to not occur free in the lower sequent. Notice that
this satisfies the subformula property, in the ‘wide’ sense of FO logic, i.e. up to substitution.
For fragments of PA with induction axioms of bounded logical complexity, we also have the
bounded quantifier rules:
Γ, a < s, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Γ, ∃x < s.ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t)
Γ, t < s⇒ ∆,∃x < s.ϕ(x)
Γ, a < s⇒ ∆, ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x < s.ϕ(x)
Γ, ϕ(t)⇒ ∆
Γ, t < s, ∀x < s.ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
In all cases the eigenvariable a occurs only as indicated,
The following normalisation result is well-known in the proof theory of arithmetic, and
will be one of the main structural proof theoretic tools in this work:
Theorem 2.5 (Free-cut elimination, e.g. [Bus98]). Let S be a sequent system extending
FO by the induction rule and some other nonlogical rules/axioms closed under substitution.
Then any S-proof can be effectively transformed into one of the same conclusion containing
only (substitution instances of) subformulae of the conclusion, an induction formula or a
formula occurring in another nonlogical step.
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Naturally, this applies to the various fragments of PA that we consider. In particular,
notice that a free-cut free proof in IΣn or IΠn of sequents containing only Σn or Πn formulae,
resp., contains just Σn or Πn formulae, resp. It is well known that Thm. 2.5 can itself be
proved within IΣ1 and even weaker theories (see, e.g., [HP93]), under an appropriate coding
of mathematical objects. We use this observation later in Sect. 8.
We say that a sequent is Σn (or Πn) if it contains only Σn (resp. Πn) formulae. A slight
issue that will be relevant later in Sect. 4 is that we have not defined Σn and Πn as being
syntactically closed under positive Boolean combinations, even if semantically we know that
they are. In fact, this does not cause a problem for the result above, since we can always
prenex ‘on the fly’ in a proof by cutting against appropriate derivations. For instance, in a
proof, a step of the form,
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ∀y.ψ
∧
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀x.ϕ ∧ ∀y.ψ
may be locally replaced by a derivation of the form:
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x.ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,∀y.ψ ∀x.ϕ,∀y.ψ ⇒ ∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
cut
Γ,∀y.ψ ⇒ ∆, ∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
cut
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x, y.(ϕ ∧ ψ)
In a similar way we will often assume that a ‘block’ of existential or universal quantifiers is
coded by a single quantifier, using pairings and Go¨del β functions, whose basic properties
are all formalisable already in I∆0 (see, e.g., [Bus98]).
3. Preliminaries on cyclic arithmetic and automata
Before presenting ‘cyclic arithmetic’, we will present the general notion of non-wellfounded
proofs in arithmetic, from [Sim17].
By convention, we say binary tree to mean a nonempty set T ⊆ {0, 1}∗ that is prefix-
closed, i.e. if σi ∈ T then σ ∈ T . We construe such T as a bona fide tree with nodes T and
directed edges from σ to σi, if σi ∈ T , for i ∈ {0, 1}. The empty word, ε, is the root of T .
Definition 3.1. A preproof is a possibly infinite binary tree labelled by sequents and
rules in a locally correct manner in the calculus for Q. Following [Sim17], we treat inference
steps as nodes of the tree and sequents as edges. A preproof is regular if it has only finitely
many distinct (labelled) subtrees or, equivalently, if it is the unfolding of a finite labelled
directed graph, possibly with cycles.
The following notions are variants of those from Dfns. 1 and 2 in [Sim17]:
Definition 3.2 (Precursors, traces, ∞-proofs). Let (Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 be an infinite branch
through a preproof. For terms t, t′ we say that t′ is a precursor of t at i if one of the
following holds:
i) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a θ-sub-step and t is θ(t′).
ii) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes any other step and t′ = t occurs in Γi.
iii) Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes any other step and t′ is t.
A trace along (Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 is a sequence (ti)i≥n, for some n ≥ 0, such that whenever i ≥ n
the term ti occurs in Γi ⇒ ∆i and,
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(a) ti+1 is a precursor of ti at i; or
(b) the atomic formula ti+1 < t occurs in Γi+1, where t is a precursor of ti at i.
When (b) holds, we say that the trace progresses at i+ 1.
An ∞-proof is a preproof for which any infinite branch has a trace that progresses
infinitely often. If it is regular then we simply call it a cyclic proof. CA is the theory
induced by cyclic proofs in the calculus for Q.
Remark 3.3. When defining explicit traces, for the precursor case iii), we will typically
not worry about whether the term ti in a trace occurs in the sequent or not. All that
matters is that, if the current step is ∃-l, ∀-r or sub, ti does not contain the associated
eigenvariables.1 As long as we satisfy this constraint we may simply consider an equivalent
proof that prepends ti = ti to the antecedent to make sure that ti ‘occurs’. We use this
assumption implicitly in the remainder of this work.
The reader may consult [Sim17] for several examples of ∞-proofs. Notably, ∞-proofs
are sound and complete for the standard model N (Thm. 4, [Sim17]). (Similar results for
other logics, with respect to standard models, were known before [Bro06, BS11].) We recall
the proof of soundness since we will have to formalise a variant of it in Sect. 6, and also
since the quantifier case in the argument of [Sim17] is omitted, whereas this subtlety will
need some consideration when it is formalised.
Proposition 3.4 (Soundness of ∞-proofs). If pi is an ∞-proof of ϕ, then N  ϕ.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e. N  ¬ϕ. We will inductively construct an infinite branch
(Γi ⇒ ∆i)i≥0 of pi and associated assignments ρi of natural numbers to each sequent’s free
variables, such that N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i. Assuming ϕ is closed (by taking its universal closure),
we set Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 to be ⇒ ϕ and ρ0 = ∅.
Each step except for substitution, ∀-r and ∃-l constitutes a true implication, so if
N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i then ρi also must not satisfy one of its premisses. We may thus choose one
such premiss as Γi+1 ⇒ ∆i+1 and set ρi+1 = ρi.
If Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a θ-sub step, we may set ρi+1 = ρi ◦ θ. If Γi ⇒ ∆i concludes a ∀-r
step, let ∀x.ϕ be the principal formula and assume x does not occur free in the conclusion.
Since N, ρi 2 Γi ⇒ ∆i, we must have that N, ρi  ∃x.¬ϕ. We choose a value k ∈ N witnessing
this existential and set ρi+1 = ρi ∪ {x 7→ k}. The ∃-l case is dealt with similarly.
This infinite branch must have an infinitely progressing trace, say (ti)i≥n, by the
definition of ∞-proof. However notice that, for i ≥ n, ρi(ti) ≥ ρi+1(ti+1) and, furthermore,
at a progress point along the trace, ρi(ti) > ρi+1(ti+1). Thus, (ρi(ti))i≥n is a monotone
decreasing sequence of natural numbers that does not converge, contradicting the fact that
N is well-ordered.
Later, in Sect. 6, we will use the fact that the choices for generating an invalid branch in the
proof above can be made uniformly in an arithmetic setting.
3.1. Defining CΣn. Simpson proposes in [Sim17] to study systems of cyclic proofs containing
only Σn formulae, and to compare such systems to IΣn. This is rather pertinent in light
of the free-cut elimination result we stated, Thm. 2.5: any IΣn-proof of a Σn-sequent can
be assumed to contain just Σn formulae (possibly at a non-elementary cost in proof size),
whence the comparison. However, in order to be able to admit routine derivations of more
1We say that a is an eigenvariable of a θ-sub step if it is in the support of the substitution θ.
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complex formulae, e.g. the Σn+1 law of excluded middle or the universal closure of a Σn
sequent, we will close this notion under logical consequence.
Definition 3.5. Let Φ be a set of formulae closed under subformulae and substitution. CΦ
is the first-order theory axiomatised by the universal closures of conclusions of cyclic proofs
containing only Φ-formulae.
Notice that, by the free-cut elimination result, Thm. 2.5, and the subformula property,
any CΣn proofs of Σn-sequents contain only Σn-sequents anyway, without loss of generality.
This more ‘robust’ definition allows us to easily compare fragments of cyclic arithmetic. For
instance, we have the following:
Proposition 3.6. CΣn = CΠn, for n ≥ 0.
Proof. For the left-right inclusion, replace each Σn sequent ~p,Γ ⇒ ∆ with the sequent
~p,∆ ⇒ Γ, where Γ and ∆ contain the De Morgan dual formulae of Γ and ∆ resp. and ~p
exhausts the atomic formulae of the antecedent. Any traces will be preserved and the proof
can be made correct by locally adding some logical steps. The converse implication is proved
in the same way.
Using a standard technique, e.g. from [Bro06], we also can rather simply show the
following result, which we will later strengthen in Sect. 4:2
Proposition 3.7. CΣn proves any Πn+1 theorem of IΣn, for n ≥ 0.
Proof sketch. Suppose IΣn proves ∀~x.ψ(~x) where ϕ is Σn. Let pi be a free-cut free IΣn proof
of ψ(~a), so in particular contains only Σn formulas, by the subformula property. We may
now construct a CΣn proof of ϕ(~a) by simply simulating every local inference step of pi; the
only nontrivial case is the induction rule:
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
ind
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
This is simulated by the following cyclic derivation (omitting some routine proof steps),
Γ⇒ ϕ(0),∆
=
0 = b,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
...
cut •
Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
sub
Γ⇒ ϕ(a),∆ Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
cut
a < b,Γ⇒ ϕ(sa),∆
b = sa,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
0 < b,Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
cut •
Γ⇒ ϕ(b),∆
sub
Γ⇒ ϕ(t),∆
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. An infinite branch that does not
have a tail in the proofs of the two premisses of ind must eventually loop on •. Therefore it
admits an infinitely progressing trace alternating between a and b, with the progress point
underlined above. Now the proposition follows by simple application of ∀-r.
2A similar result was given in [Sim17], but that argument rather shows that IΣn ⊆ CΣn+1.
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Following Rmk. 3.3, notice that, e.g. in the simulation of induction above, traces need
not be connected in the graph of ancestry of a proof. This deviates from other settings where
it is occurrences that are tracked, rather than terms, e.g. in [DBHS16, BDS16, Dou17].
3.2. Bu¨chi automata: checking correctness of cyclic proofs. A cyclic preproof can
be effectively checked for correctness by reduction to the inclusion of ‘Bu¨chi automata’,
yielding a PSPACE bound. As far as the author is aware, this is the best known upper
bound, although no corresponding lower bound is known. As we will see later in Sect. 6,
this is one of the reasons why we cannot hope for a ‘polynomial simulation’ of cyclic proofs
in a usual proof system, and so why elementary simulations are more pertinent.
Definition 3.8. A nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton (NBA)A is a tuple (A,Q, δ, q0, F )
where: A is a finite set, called the alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, δ ⊆ (Q×A)×Q
is the transition relation, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is the set of final or
accepting states. We say that A is deterministic (a DBA) if δ is (the graph of) a function
Q×A→ Q. A ‘word’ (ai)i≥0 ∈ Aω is accepted or recognised by A if there is a sequence
(qi)i≥0 ∈ Qω such that: for each i ≥ 0, (qi, ai, qi+1) ∈ δ, and for infinitely many i ≥ 0 we
have qi ∈ F . We write L(A) for the set of words in Aω accepted by A.
From a cyclic preproof pi we can easily define two automata, say Apib and Apit ,3 respectively
accepting just the infinite branches and just the infinite branches with infinitely progressing
traces. See [Sim17] for a construction of Apit . We point out that Apib is essentially just the
dependency graph of pi with all states final, and so is in fact deterministic;4 we will rely
on this observation later in Sects. 6, 7 and 9. We now state the well-known ‘correctness
criterion’ for cyclic proofs:
Proposition 3.9 [Sim17]. A cyclic preproof pi is a ∞-proof iff L(Apib ) ⊆ L(Apit ).
4. A translation from IΣn+1 to CΣn, over Πn+1-theorems
We show in this section our first result, that cyclic proofs containing only Σn-formulae are
enough to simulate IΣn+1 over not-too-complex formulae:
Theorem 4.1. IΣn+1 ⊆ CΣn, over Πn+1 theorems, for n ≥ 0.
One example of such logical power in cyclic proofs was given in [Sim17], in the form of
CΣ1 proofs of the totality of the Ackermann-Pe´ter function. This already separates it from
IΣ1, which only proves the totality of the primitive recursive functions [Par72]. To prove
the theorem above, we will rather work in IΠn+1, cf. Prop. 2.4, since the exposition is more
intuitive. We first prove the following intermediate lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let pi be a IΠn+1 proof, containing only Πn+1 formulae, of a sequent,
Γ,∀x1.ϕ1, . . . ,∀xl.ϕl ⇒ ∆,∀y1.ψ1, . . . ,∀ym.ψm (4.1)
3These are rather called Bp and Bt respectively in [Sim17].
4Technically the transition relation here is not total, but this can be ‘completed’ in the usual way by
adding a non-final ‘sink’ state for any outstanding transitions.
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where Γ,∆, ϕi, ψj are Σn and xi, yj occur only in ϕi, ψj respectively. Then there is a CΣn
derivation dpie of the form:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
dpie
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ1, . . . , ψm
Moreover, no free variables of (4.1) occur as eigenvariables for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps in dpie.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of pi. Notice that we may assume that any
Πn+1 formulae occurring have just a single outermost ∀ quantifier, by interpreting arguments
as pairs and using Go¨del’s β functions. (This introduces only cuts on formulae of the
same form.) We henceforth write ~ϕ for ϕ1, . . . , ϕl and ~ψ for ψ1, . . . , ψm and, as an abuse of
notation, ∀~x.~ϕ and ∀~y.~ψ for ∀x1.ϕ1, . . . ,∀xl.ϕl and ∀y1.ψ1, . . . ,∀ym.ψm respectively. (Notice
that this is a reasonable abuse of notation, since ∀s can be prenexed outside conjunctions
and disjunctions already in pure FO logic.)
Propositional logical steps are easily dealt with, relying on invertibility and cuts, with
possible structural steps. Importantly, due to the statement of the lemma, such steps apply
to only Σn formulae (recall the discussion at the end of Sect. 2). For instance, if pi extends a
proof pi′ by a ∧-left step,
Γ, χ0, χ1,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ∧-l
Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ
then we define dpie as, χ0, χ1 ⇒ χ0 ∧ χ1 Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ ∆, ϕicut
Γ, χ0, χ1 ⇒ ∆, ϕi

i≤l
dpi′e
Γ, χ0, χ1 ⇒ ∆, ~ψ∧-l
Γ, χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
and if pi extends proofs pi0 and pi1 by a ∧-right step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ0, ∀~y.~ψ Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ1,∀~y.~ψ∧-r
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1,∀~y.~ψ
then we define dpie as:  Γ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1, ϕi χ0 ∧ χ1 ⇒ χjcut
Γ⇒ ∆, χj , ϕi

i≤l
dpije
Γ⇒ ∆, χj , ~ψ∧-r ∀j < 2
Γ⇒ ∆, χ0 ∧ χ1, ~ψ
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If pi extends a proof pi′ by a thinning step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ
wk
Γ′,Π,Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∆′, ∀~z.~χ
where Γ′,∆′, ~χ are Σn and Π is Πn+1, then we define dpie as:
{Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi,∆′}i≤l
Γ′,dpi′e,∆′
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∆′
wk
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∆′, ~χ
where Γ′, dpi′e,∆′ is obtained from dpi′e by prepending Γ′ and appending ∆′ to each sequent.
For this we might need to rename some free variables in pi′ so that eigenvariable conditions are
preserved after the transformation; this does not affect the cedents Γ,∆ by the assumption
from the inductive hypothesis. Notice that we are simply ignoring the extra premisses due
to Π.
If pi extends proofs pi0 and pi1 by a cut step on a Πn+1 formula,
Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ, ∀z.χ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
cut
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ
then we define dpie as:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
dpi0e
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ϕi
}
i≤l
dpi1e, ~ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ~ψ
........................
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
The final dotted ‘contraction’ step is implicit, since we treat cedents as sets. Again, we
might need to rename some variables in pi1. If instead the cut formula were Σn, say χ, we
would define dpie as:
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
dpi0e
Γ⇒ ∆, χ, ~ψ
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ, χ⇒ ∆, ϕi
}
i≤l
dpi1e
Γ, χ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
cut
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
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If pi extends a proof pi′ by a ∀-left step,
Γ, χ(t), ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ
∀-l
Γ,∀z.χ(z), ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ
where ∀z.χ(z) is Πn+1, we define dpie as follows:
Γ⇒ ∆, χ(z)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, χ(t)
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ, χ(t)⇒ ∆, ϕi
}
i≤l
dpi′e
Γ, χ(t)⇒ ∆, ~ψ
cut
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ
(Notice that, although z occurs as an eigenvariable for a sub step here, it is already bound
in the conclusion of pi, so we preserve the inductive hypothesis.) If pi extends a proof pi′ by a
∀-right step,
Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ, χ
∀-r
Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ
where ∀z.χ is Πn+1, then we define dpie as:{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi, χ
}
i≤l
dpi′e,χ
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ
If pi extends a proof pi′ by a ∃-right step,
Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ, χ(t)
∃-r
Γ, ∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ,∃z.χ(z)
where ∃z.χ(z) is Σn, then we define dpie as:{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi, ∃z.χ(z)
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi, χ(t), ∃z.χ(z)
}
i≤l
dpi′e,∃z.χ(z)
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(t),∃z.χ(z)
∃-r
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ,∃z.χ(z)
Again, some eigenvariables of pi′ might have to be renamed. Any other quantifier steps are
dealt with routinely.
Finally, if pi extends proofs pi0 and pi
′ by an induction step,
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(0) Γ,∀~x.~ϕ, ∀z.χ(c)⇒ ∆,∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(sc)
ind
Γ,∀~x.~ϕ⇒ ∆, ∀~y.~ψ,∀z.χ(t)
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we define dpie to be the following cyclic proof,
{Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi}i≤l
dpi0e
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(0)
d = 0,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
... •
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(c)
{
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕi
wk
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, ϕi
}
i≤l
dpi′e, ~ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(sc)
c < d, d = sc,Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d) •
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(d)
sub
Γ⇒ ∆, ~ψ, χ(t)
where we have written • to mark roots of identical subtrees. Notice that any branch hitting
• infinitely often will have an infinitely progressing trace alternating between c and d, by the
underlined progress point c < d: thanks to the assumption from the inductive hypothesis,
c will not occur in dpi′e as an eigenvariable for ∃-l, ∀-r or sub steps so the trace along c in
dpi′e remains intact, cf. Rmk. 3.3. Any other infinite branch has a tail that is already in dpi′e
or dpi0e and so has an infinitely progressing trace by the inductive hypothesis.
The lemma above gives us a simple proof of the main result of this section:
Proof of Thm. 4.1. Let pi be a IΠn+1 proof of a sequent ⇒ ∀x.ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Σn, under
Prop. 2.4. By Thm. 2.5 we may assume that pi contains only Πn+1 cuts, whence we may
simply apply Lemma 4.2 to obtain a CΣn proof of⇒ ϕ. (Notice that there are no assumption
sequents after applying the lemma since the antecedent is empty.) Now the result follows
simply by an application of ∀-r.
For the interested reader, we have given an example of this translation in action in
App. A, for a ‘relativised’ version of arithmetic with an uninterpreted function symbol.
5. Second-order theories for reasoning about automata
We now consider a two-sorted, or ‘second-order’ (SO), version of FO logic, with variables
X,Y, Z, etc. ranging over sets of individuals, and new atomic formulae t ∈ X, sometimes
written X(t). We also have SO quantifiers binding the SO variables with the natural
interpretation. Again, we give only brief preliminaries, but the reader is encouraged to
consult the standard texts [Sim09] and [Hir14].
We write Q2 for an appropriate extension of Q by basic axioms governing sets (see, e.g.,
[Sim09] or [Hir14]), and write Σ0n and Π
0
n for the classes Σn and Πn respectively, but now
allowing free set variables to occur.
Definition 5.1. The recursive comprehension axiom schema is the following:5
∆01-CA : ∀~y, ~Y .(∀x.(ϕ(x, ~y, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x, ~y, ~Y )) ⊃ ∃X.∀x.(X(x) ≡ ϕ(x)))
5Notice that there is an unfortunate coincidence of the notation CA for ‘comprehension axiom’ and ‘cyclic
arithmetic’, but the context of use should always avoid any ambiguity.
1:14 A. Das Vol. 16:1
where ϕ,ψ are in Σ01 and X does not occur free in ϕ or ψ. From here, the theory RCA0 is
defined as Q2 + ∆
0
1-CA + Σ
0
1-IND.
Since we will always work in extensions of RCA0, which proves the totality of primitive
recursive functions, we will conservatively add function symbols for primitive recursive
functions on individuals whenever we need them. We will also henceforth consider FO
theories extended by ‘oracles’, i.e. uninterpreted set/predicate variables, in order to access
‘uniform’ classes of FO proofs. We write IΣn(X) for the same class of proofs as IΣn but
where X is allowed to occur as a predicate symbol. The usefulness of a IΣn(X) proof is that
we may later substitute X for a FO formula, say ϕ(−) ∈ ∆m+1, to arrive at a IΣm+n proof
of size O(|ϕ|). This ‘parametrisation’ of a FO proof allows us to avoid unnecessary blowups
in proof size induced by ‘non-uniform’ translations from second-order theories; we implicitly
use this observation for proof complexity bounds later, particularly in Sect. 6.
The following result is an adaptation of well known conservativity results, e.g. as found
in [Sim09, Hir14], but we include a proof anyway for completeness.
Proposition 5.2. RCA0 + Σ
0
n-IND is conservative over IΣn(X).
Proof sketch. First we introduce countably many fresh set symbols X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ, indexed by Σ
0
1
formulae ϕ(x, ~x, ~X), ψ(x, ~x, ~X) with all free variables indicated, FO terms ~t with |~t| = |~x|
and SO variables ~Y with |~Y | = | ~X|. These will serve as witnesses to the sets defined by
comprehension. We replace the comprehension axioms by initial sequents of the form:
Γ,∀x.(ϕ(x,~t, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x,~t, ~Y )), ϕ(t,~t, ~Y )⇒ t ∈ X~t,~Yϕ,ψ,∆
(5.1)
Γ,∀x.(ϕ(x,~t, ~Y ) ≡ ¬ψ(x,~t, ~Y )), t ∈ X~t,~Yϕ,ψ ⇒ ϕ(t,~t, ~Y ),∆
(5.2)
It is routine to show that these new initial sequents are equivalent to the comprehension
axioms for ϕ,ψ.
Now we apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 2.5, to a proof in such a system and replace
every occurrence of t ∈ X~t,~Yϕ,ψ with ϕ(t,~t, ~Y ), and every occurrence of t /∈ X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ with ψ(t,
~t, ~Y ).
(Recall here that we assume formulae are in De Morgan normal form.) Any comprehension
initial sequents affected by this replacement become purely logical theorems. Furthermore,
any induction formulae remain Σ0n, provably in pure logic, thanks to our consideration of
whether X
~t,~Y
ϕ,ψ occurs positively or negatively. Any extraneous free set variables in induction
steps (except X), e.g. Y , may be safely dealt with by replacing any atomic formula Y (s)
with >. The resulting proof is in IΣn(X).
It is worth pointing out that, in general, the transformation from a SO proof to a FO
proof can yield a possibly non-elementary blowup in the size of proofs, due to, e.g., the
application of (free-)cut elimination.
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5.1. Formalisation of Bu¨chi acceptance. From now on we will be rather informal when
talking about finite objects, e.g. automata, finite sequences, or even formulae. In particular
we may freely use such meta-level objects within object-level formulae when, in fact, we are
formally referring to their ‘Go¨del numbers’. Also, statements inside quotations, “-”, will
usually be (provably) recursive in any free variables occurring, i.e. ∆01. This way quantifier
complexity is (usually) safely measured by just the quantifiers outside quotations.
We often treat a set symbol X as a binary predicate by interpreting its argument as a
pair and using Go¨del’s ‘β functions’ to primitive-recursively extract its components. We use
such predicates to encode sequences by interpreting X(x, y) as “the xth symbol of X is y”;
this interpretation presumes we already have the totality and determinism of X as a binary
relation. Formally, for a set S and a set symbol X treated as a binary predicate, we will
write X ∈ Sω for the conjunction of the following two formulae,
∀x.∃y ∈ S.X(x, y) (5.3)
∀x, y, z.((X(x, y) ∧X(x, z)) ⊃ y = z) (5.4)
i.e. X is, in fact, the graph of a function N→ S. When we know that these formulae hold
true for X, we may construe the expression X(x) as a term in formulae, for instance writing
ϕ(X(x)) as shorthand for ∃y.(X(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently, ∀y.(X(x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)).
Definition 5.3 (Language membership). Let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a NBA and treat X
as a binary predicate symbol. We define the formula X ∈ L(A) as:
X ∈ Aω ∧ ∃Y ∈ Qω.
 Y (0, q0)∧ ∀x. (Y (x), X(x), Y (sx)) ∈ δ
∧ ∀x.∃x′ > x. Y (x′) ∈ F
 (5.5)
If A is deterministic and X ∈ Aω, we write qX(x, y) for “y is the xth state of the run of X
on A”, which is provably recursive in RCA0. Similarly to before, we may write ϕ(qX(x)) as
shorthand for ∃y.(qX(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)) or, equivalently in RCA0, for ∀y.(qX(x, y) ⊃ ϕ(y)). For
DBA, we alternatively define X ∈ L(A) as:
X ∈ Aω ∧ ∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x′) ∈ F (5.6)
This ‘double definition’ will not be problematic for us, since RCA0 can check if an automaton
is deterministic or not and, if so, even prove the equivalence between the two definitions:
Proposition 5.4. RCA0 ` ∀ DBA A.((5.5) ≡ (5.6)).
Proof sketch. Let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a deterministic automaton. For the left-right
implication let Y ∈ Qω be an ‘accepting run’ of X on A and use induction to show that
Y (x, qX(x)). For the right-left implication, we use comprehension to define an ‘accepting
run’ Y ∈ Qω by: Y (x, q) ≡ qX(x, q). Clearly the definition of Y is ∆01, and we can show
that such Y is a ‘correct run’ by induction on x.
Notice that, for a deterministic automaton, the formula for acceptance is arithmetical
in X, i.e. there are no SO quantifiers. This will be rather important for uniformity in the
simulation of cyclic proofs in the next section.
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5.2. Formalisations of some automaton constructions. Recall that we may freely add
symbols for primitive recursive functions to our language. Since we rely on various results
from [KMPS19] as the ‘engine’ behind some of our proofs, we will use their notions for
manipulating automata.
For NBAA,A′, we writeAc andAunionsqA′ to denote the complement and union constructions
of automata from [KMPS19] (Sects. 5 and 6 resp.). We also write Empty(A) for the recursive
algorithm from [KMPS19] (Sect. 6), expressed as a Σ1 formula in A, determining whether
A computes the empty language. It will also be useful for us later, in order to bound logical
and proof complexity, to notice that DBA can already be complemented in RCA0. This is a
rather unsurprising result but does not appear in [KMPS19], so we give it here.
For a DBA A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ), we define a complementary NBA Ac as follows,
Ac := (A, (Q× {0}) ∪ ((Q \ F )× {1}), δc, (q0, 0), (Q \ F )× {1})
where δc ⊆ (Qc ×A)×Qc (writing Qc for Q× {0} ∪ (Q \ F )× {1}) is defined as:
{((q, 0), a, (q′, 0)) : (q, a, q′) ∈ δ}
∪ {((q, i), a, (q′, 1)) : (q, a, q′) ∈ δ, i = 0, 1, q′ ∈ Q \ F}
The idea behind this construction is that a run of Ac follows A freely for some finite time
(in the ‘0’ component), after which it may no longer visit final states of A (once in the ‘1’
component). The determinism of A guarantees that such a word is not accepted by it.
By directly inspecting the definitions from [KMPS19], and DBA complementation above,
we have the following properties:
Observation 5.5. For NBA A,A′ we have that:
(1) Empty(A) is a polynomial-time predicate in A.
(2) A unionsqA′ is constructible in polynomial-time from A and A′.
(3) Ac is constructible in exponential-time from A.
For a DBA A, we have that:
(4) Ac is constructible in polynomial-time from A.
None of these bounds are surprising, due to known bounds on the complexity of union, com-
plementation and emptiness checking for (non)deterministic Bu¨chi automata. Nonetheless it
is important to state them for the particular constructions used in this work for bounds on
proof complexity later.
Lemma 5.6. From [KMPS19] we have the following:
(1) RCA0 ` ∀ NBA A.(Empty(A) ≡ ∀X ∈ Aω.X /∈ L(A)).
(2) RCA0 ` ∀ NBA A1,A2.(X ∈ L(A1 unionsq A2) ≡ (X ∈ L(A1) ∨X ∈ L(A2))).
(3) RCA0 + Σ
0
2-IND ` ∀ NBA A.(X ∈ Aω ⊃ (X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A))).
We also have that:
(4) RCA0 ` ∀ DBA A. (X ∈ Aω ⊃ (X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A))).
Proof. 1, 2 and 3 follow from [KMPS19], namely from Prop. 6.1 and Lemma 5.2, so we give
a proof of 4.
Working in RCA0, let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a DBA. For the right-left implication, if
X /∈ L(A) then ∃x.∀x′ > x. qX(x) /∈ F , so let x0 witness this existential. Now, define by
comprehension the run Y ∈ (Qc)ω as follows:
Y (x, y) ≡ ((x ≤ x0 ∧ y = (qX(x), 0)) ∨ (x > x0 ∧ y = (qX(x), 1)))
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Now, indeed Y (0, (q0, 0)), since qX(0) = q0, and Y is a correct run of X on Ac by considering
separately the cases x < x0, x = x0 and x > x0. Finally, for any x, Y hits a final state at
max(x, x0) + 1 > x.
For the left-right implication, suppose X ∈ L(Ac) and let Y ∈ (Qc)ω be an accepting
run. By induction we have ∀x.(Y (x) = (qX(x), 0) ∨ Y (x) = (qX(x), 1)). Now, Y must
eventually hit an accepting state of Ac, i.e. in the 1-component, say at position x0. Again
by induction, we may show that Y remains in the 1-component of Ac after x0, and hence
qX(x) /∈ F for x ≥ x0, as required.
6. An exponential simulation of CA in PA
In this section we will adapt Simpson’s approach in [Sim17] for showing that CA ⊆ PA
into a uniform result in PA. This essentially constitutes a formalisation of the soundness
argument, Prop. 3.4, in a SO theory conservative over the target fragment of PA. The
‘uniformity’ we aim for ensures that the possibly non-elementary blowup translating from
SO proofs to FO proofs occurs once and for all for a single arithmetical theorem. Only then
do we instantiate the theorem (inside PA) by the cyclic proof in question, leading to an only
elementary blowup.
To give an idea of how the result is obtained, and how our exposition refines that of
[Sim17], we take advantage of the following aspects of the soundness argument for cyclic
proofs:
(a) The Bu¨chi automaton accepting all infinite branches of a cyclic proof is, in fact,
deterministic, and so we can express acceptance of an ω-word in this automaton
arithmetically.
(b) A branch of invalid sequents and corresponding assignments, as in the proof of Prop. 3.4,
can be uniformly generated from an initial unsatisfying assignment by an arithmetical
formula.
(c) Since all inductions are only up to ω, we need only arbitrarily often progressing traces,
rather than explicit infinitely progressing traces.
Together, these properties give us just enough ‘wiggle room’ to carry out the soundness
argument in a sufficiently uniform way.
Throughout this section we will also carefully track how much quantifier complexity is
used in theorem statements, since we will later modify this argument to obtain a converse
result to Thm. 4.1.
6.1. An arithmetically uniform treatment of automata. Referring to (c) above, we
define an arithmetical corollary of NBA acceptance that is nonetheless sufficiently strong to
formalise the soundness argument for cyclic proofs:
Definition 6.1 (Arithmetic acceptance). Let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) be a NBA and X ∈ Aω,
and temporarily write:
• F (x) := “x is a finite run of X on A ending at a final state”.
• E(z, x, y) := “z extends x to a finite run of X on A hitting ≥ y final states”
We define:
ArAcc(X,A) := X ∈ Aω ∧ ∃x. (F (x) ∧ ∀y.∃z.E(z, x, y)) (6.1)
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For intuition, we may consider ω-regular expressions rather than automata, which are of
the form
∑
i<n
ei · fωi , for some n ∈ N, without loss of generality. The formula ArAcc for this
expression essentially recognises infinite words that have prefixes of the form στk for some
σ ∈ L(ei), for some i < n, and τk ∈ L(fki ) for each k ∈ N. Clearly the condition ArAcc is a
(provable) consequence of acceptance itself:
Proposition 6.2. RCA0 ` ∀A.(X ∈ L(A) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A)).
Proof. Working in RCA0, fix A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ) and suppose X ∈ L(A). Let Y ∈ Qω be an
‘accepting run’ of X on A, cf. (5.5). We may show that,
∃z ∈ Q∗.“z is a finite prefix of Y hitting ≥ y final states in A” (6.2)
by Σ01-induction on y, appealing to the unboundedness of final states in Y for both the
base case and the inductive steps. Now, in the definition of ArAcc in (6.1), we set x to be
the least such z for which (6.2)[1/y] holds (again by induction), so that F (x) from (6.1)
holds. Thus, for any y ∈ N, we may find an appropriate z making E(z, x, y) in (6.1) true by
appealing to (6.2). The fact that z extends x follows from leastness of x and that Y is a
sequence, cf. (5.3) and (5.4).
Let us write A1 v A2 for Empty((Ac1 unionsq A2)c). We may now present our main ‘uniform’
result needed to carry out our soundness proof in FO theories.
Theorem 6.3. RCA0 + Σ
0
2-IND proves:
∀ DBA A1,∀ NBA A2. ((A1 v A2 ∧X ∈ L(A1)) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A2)) (6.3)
Proof. Working in RCA0 +Σ
0
2-IND, let A1 be a DBA and A2 be a NBA such that X ∈ L(A1)
and A1 v A2. We have:
Empty((Ac1 unionsq A2)c) since A1 v A2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω. Y /∈ L((Ac1 unionsq A2)c) by Lemma 5.6.1
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω. Y ∈ L(Ac1 unionsq A2) by Lemma 5.6.3
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(Ac1) ∨ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 5.6.2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(A1) ⊃ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 5.6.4
=⇒ X ∈ L(A2) since X ∈ L(A1)
=⇒ ArAcc(X,A2) by Prop. 6.2.
Noticing that DBA acceptance is also purely arithmetical in X (cf. (a)), by the conservativity
result Prop. 5.2, we have:
Corollary 6.4. IΣ2(X) proves (6.3).
6.2. Formalising the soundness argument for cyclic proofs. At this point we are
able to mostly mimic the formalisation of the soundness argument from [Sim17], although we
must further show that a branch of invalid sequents, cf. the proof of Prop. 3.4, is uniformly
describable (cf. (b)).
For n ≥ 0, let N, ρ n ϕ be an appropriate ∆n+1 formula (provably in IΣn+1) asserting
that a formula ϕ is true in N under the assignment ρ of its free variables to natural numbers, as
long as ϕ is a Boolean combination of Σn (or Πn) formulae.
6 Formally, the formula N, ρ n ϕ
6If ϕ is not a Boolean combination of Σn formulae then N, ρ n ϕ crashes and returns ⊥.
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takes as arguments the codes of ρ and ϕ, i.e. their Go¨del numbers; the construction of such
a formula for n is standard (see, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93]) and it has size polynomial in
n. Importantly, there are IΣn+1 proofs that n satisfies ‘Tarski’s truth conditions’. Writing
Bool(Φ) for the class of Boolean combinations of Φ-formulae, we have:
Proposition 6.5 (Properties of n, see e.g. [HP93]). For n ≥ 0, the following Πn+1 formulae
have IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n:
(1) ∀ϕ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n ¬ϕ ≡ N, ρ 2n ϕ).
(2) ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∨ N, ρ  ψ)).
(3) ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ. (N, ρ n (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ (N, ρ n ϕ ∧ N, ρ  ψ)).
(4) ∀ϕ ∈ Σn.∀ρ. (N, ρ n ∃x.ϕ ≡ ∃y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ϕ)).
(5) ∀ϕ ∈ Πn.∀ρ. (N, ρ n ∀x.ϕ ≡ ∀y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ϕ)).
We also have IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of the substitution property:
(6) ∀ϕ ∈ Bool(Σn).∀ρ.∀ terms t. (N, ρ ∪ {a 7→ ρ(t)} n ϕ ≡ N, ρ n ϕ[t/a]).
In particular we have the reflection property :
Proposition 6.6 (Reflection). For n ≥ 0 we have IΣ1 ` ϕ ≡ (N,∅ n ϕ) with proofs of
size polynomial in n and |ϕ|, for any closed formula ϕ ∈ Σn ∪Πn.
Henceforth, all our proof complexity bounds in n follow from the fact that proofs are
parametrised by n and its basic properties from Prop. 6.5 above.
Definition 6.7 (Uniform description of an invalid branch). Let pi be a CA preproof of a
sequent Γ⇒ ∆, and let n ∈ N be such that all formulae occurring in pi are Σn. Let ρ0 be
an assignment such that N, ρ0 n
∧
Γ but N, ρ0 2n
∨
∆. The branch of pi generated by
ρ0 is the invalid branch as constructed in the proof of Prop. 3.4, where at each step that
there is a choice of premiss the leftmost one is chosen, and at each step when there is a
choice of assignment of a natural number to a free variable the least one is chosen. We write
Branchn(pi, ρ0, x, y) for the following predicate:
“the xth element of the branch generated by ρ0 in pi is y”
To be precise, the ‘element’ y is given as a pair 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉 consisting of a sequent
Γx ⇒ ∆x and an assignment ρx that invalidates it.
Notice that Branchn(pi, ρ0, x, y) is recursive w.r.t. the oracle n, and so is expressible by
a ∆1(n) formula, making it altogether ∆n+1 in its arguments. In fact, this is demonstrably
the case in IΣn+1, which can prove that Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) is the graph of a function, as
shown in Prop. 6.8 below.
Let us write conc(pi) for the conclusion of a CA proof pi and, as in Sect. 3.2, Apib and
Apit for its branch and trace automata, resp. When we write N, ρ n (Γ⇒ ∆) we mean the
∆n+1 formula (N, ρ 2n
∧
Γ) ∨ (N, ρ n
∨
∆).
Proposition 6.8. For n ≥ 0, there are IΣn+1 proofs of size polynomial in n of:
∀pi a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
∀ρ0. ((N, ρ0 2n conc(pi)) ⊃ Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(Apib ))
(6.4)
Proof. Working in IΣn+1, let pi and ρ0 satisfy the hypotheses of (6.4) above. The fact that
Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) is deterministic, cf. (5.4), follows directly by induction on the position
1:20 A. Das Vol. 16:1
of the branch. The difficult part is to show that Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) is total, cf. (5.3),
i.e. that it never reaches a deadlock. For this we show,
∀x.∃〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉. (Branchn(pi, ρ0, x, 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉) ∧ N, ρx 2n (Γx ⇒ ∆x)) (6.5)
by Σn+1-induction on x. The base case, when x = 0, follows by assumption, so we proceed
with the inductive case. For a given x let 〈ρx,Γx ⇒ ∆x〉 witness (6.5) above and let r be
the rule instance in pi that Γx ⇒ ∆x concludes.
If r is a ∃-r step with associated term t, then there is only one premiss which we show
remains false in the current assignment. This follows from:
N, ρ 2n ∃x.ϕ =⇒ N, ρ n ∀x.¬ϕ by Prop. 6.5.1
=⇒ ∀y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Prop. 6.5.5
=⇒ N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ ρ(t)} n ¬ϕ by pure logic
=⇒ N, ρ n ¬ϕ[t/x] by Prop. 6.5.6
=⇒ N, ρ 2n ϕ[t/x] by Prop. 6.5.1.
If r is a ∀-r step then there is only one premiss, for which we show that the appropriate
invalidating assignment exists. This follows from,
N, ρ 2n ∀x.ϕ =⇒ N, ρ n ∃x.¬ϕ by Prop. 6.5.1
=⇒ ∃y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Prop. 6.5.4
=⇒ ∃ least y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} n ¬ϕ) by Σn+1-IND
=⇒ ∃ least y.(N, ρ ∪ {x 7→ y} 2n ϕ) by Prop. 6.5.1.
where, in the penultimate implication, we rely on the fact that the appropriate ‘minimisation’
property is provable in Σn+1-IND (see, e.g., [Bus98]).
If r is a left quantifier step then it is treated similarly to the two right quantifier cases
above by De Morgan duality. If r is a propositional step then the treatment is simple,
following directly from Prop. 6.5. If r is an initial sequent we immediately hit a contradiction,
since all of the axioms are provably true in all assignments. If r is a substitution step, then
the existence of the appropriate assignment follows directly from the substitution property,
Prop. 6.5.6.
Finally, we may show that every state of the run of Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) on Apib is final,
by Σn+1-induction, since it always correctly follows a branch of pi. Thus we have that
Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(Apib ).
Now we can give a formalised proof of the soundness of cyclic proofs:
Theorem 6.9 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, formalised). For n ≥ 0, there are IΣn+2 proofs
of size polynomial in n of:
∀pi a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
(Apib v Apit ⊃ ∀ρ0. N, ρ0 n conc(pi))
(6.6)
Proof. First, instantiating X in Cor. 6.4 with a ∆n+1 formula ϕn yields O(|ϕn|)-size IΣn+2
proofs of (6.3)[ϕn/X]. Hence, setting ϕn to be Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) and appealing to
Prop. 6.8 above, we arrive at IΣn+2 proofs of size polynomial in n of:
∀pi a CA preproof containing only Σn formulae.
Apib v Apit ⊃ ∀ρ0.(N, ρ0 2n conc(pi) ⊃ ArAcc(Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−),Apit ))
(6.7)
Now, working in IΣn+2, to prove (6.6) let pi satisfy Apib v Apit . For contradiction assume,
for some ρ0, that N, ρ0 2n conc(pi). By Prop. 6.8 we have Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−) ∈ L(Apib ), so
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we henceforth write Γx ⇒ ∆x and ρx for the sequent and assignment at the xth position
of Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−). By (6.7) above we have ArAcc(Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−),Apit ), so let x
witness its outer existential, cf. (6.1). Now, let y be the maximum value of ρx(t) for all
terms t occurring in Γx ⇒ ∆x. Again by ArAcc(Branchn(pi, ρ0,−,−),Apit ), we have that
there is some (finite) trace z beginning from Γx ⇒ ∆x that progresses y + 1 times. Writing
z(i) to denote the ith term in the trace z, we may show by induction on i ≤ |z| that, if there
are j progress points between z(0) and z(i), then we have that ρx(z(0)) ≥ ρx+i(z(i)) + j. In
particular, y ≥ ρx(z(0)) ≥ ρx+|z|(z(|z|)) + (y + 1) ≥ y + 1, yielding a contradiction.
6.3. PA exponentially simulates CA. We can now give our main proof complexity result:
Theorem 6.10. If pi is a CA proof of ϕ, then we can construct a PA proof of ϕ of size
exponential in |pi|.
Proof. Take the least n ∈ N such that pi contains only Σn formulae; in particular n ≤ |pi|.
Since pi is a correct cyclic proof, there is a PA proof of Apib v Apit , by exhaustive search. In
fact, such a proof in Q may be constructed in exponential time in |pi|, thanks to Obs. 5.5
and Σ1-completeness of Q (see, e.g., [HP93]). Hence, by instantiating pi in Thm. 6.9, we
have IΣn+2 proofs of N,∅ n ϕ of size exponential in |pi|. Finally by the reflection property,
Prop. 6.6, we have that IΣn+2 ` ϕ with proofs of size exponential in |pi|.
Notice that we already have a converse polynomial simulation of PA in CA by the results
of [Sim17] or, alternatively, by Prop. 3.7.
7. IΣn+1 contains CΣn
In fact the proof method we developed in the last section allows us to recover a result on
logical complexity too. By tracking precisely all the bounds therein, we obtain that CΣn is
contained in IΣn+2, which is already an improvement to Simpson’s result (see Sect. 10 for a
comparison). To derive such bounds, in this section we concern ourselves only with cyclic
proofs containing Σn formulae. The universal closures of the conclusions of such proofs
axiomatise CΣn, cf. Dfn. 3.5, so more complex theorems of CΣn are thence derivable by
pure logic.
In fact, we may actually improve this logical bound and arrive at an optimal result
(given Thm. 4.1). By more carefully analysing the proof methods of [KMPS19], namely an
inspection of the proofs of Thms. 5 and 12 in that work, we have that:
Proposition 7.1 (Implicit in [KMPS19]). RCA0 ` ∀X ∈ Aω.(X ∈ L(Ac) ≡ X /∈ L(A)),
for any NBA A.
Notice here that the universal quantification over NBA is external, so that the complementa-
tion proofs are not necessarily uniform. This is not a trivial result, since it relies on a version
of Ramsey’s theorem, the additive Ramsey theorem, which can be proved by induction on the
number of ‘colours’. Usual forms of Ramsey’s theorem are not proved by such an argument,
and in fact it is well known that RCA0 cannot even prove Ramsey’s theorem for pairs with
only two colours (see, e.g., [Hir14]). We include in App. B a self-contained (and somewhat
simpler) proof of Prop. 7.1 above, for completeness.
This allows us to ‘un-uniformise’ the results of the previous section, using Prop. 7.1
above instead of Lemma 5.6.3, in order to ‘trade off’ proof complexity for logical complexity:
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Proposition 7.2 (Soundness of cyclic proofs, non-uniformly formalised). Let n ≥ 0 and pi
be a CA proof containing only Σn formulae. IΣn+1 ` ∀ρ0.(N, ρ0 n conc(pi)).
Proof sketch. We mimic the entire argument of Thm. 6.9 by instantiating the fixed proof pi
and using Prop. 7.1 above instead of Lemma 5.6.3. In particular, the required ‘non-uniform’
versions of Thm. 6.3 and Cor. 6.4 become derivable in RCA0 and IΣ1(X) resp., thus reducing
the global induction complexity by one level. Hence we arrive at a ‘non-uniform’ version
of Thm. 6.9, peculiar to the fixed proof pi we began with, proved entirely within IΣn+1, as
required.
Theorem 7.3. For n ≥ 0, we have that CΣn ⊆ IΣn+1.
Proof. By the definition of CΣn, cf. Dfn. 3.5, it suffices to derive in IΣn+1 just the (possibly
open) conclusions of CΣn proofs containing only Σn formulae, and so the result follows
directly from Props. 7.2 and 6.6.
7.1. On the proof complexity of CΣn. One might be tempted to conclude that the ele-
mentary simulation of CA by PA should go through already for CΣn by IΣn+2 (independently
of n), due to the bounds implicit in the proof of Thm. 6.10. Furthermore, if we are willing
to give up a few more exponentials in complexity, one may even bound the size of IΣ1 proofs
arising from Prop. 7.1 by an appropriate elementary function (though this analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper).
However, we must be conscious of the ‘robustness’ of the definition of CΣn proofs in
terms of complexity. The one we gave, which essentially requires cyclic proofs to contain only
Σn-formulae, is more similar to ‘free-cut free’ IΣn proofs than general ones, cf. Thm. 2.5,
so it seems unfair to compare these notions of proof in terms of proof complexity. In fact
we may define a more natural notion of a CΣn proof from the point of view of complexity,
while inducing the same theory.
First, let us recall some notions from, e.g., [Bro06, BS11]. Any cyclic proof can be
written in ‘cycle normal form’, where any ‘backpointer’ (e.g., the conclusions of upper
sequents marked • until now) points only to a sequent that has occurred below it in the
proof. Referring to the terminology of [Bro06, BS11] etc., we say that a sequent is a bud in
a cyclic proof if it has a backpointer pointing to an identical sequent (called the companion).
Proposition 7.4. If ϕ has a CA proof whose buds and companions contain only Σn formulae
then CΣn ` ϕ.
Proof idea. Once again, we simply apply free-cut elimination, Thm. 2.5, treating any back-
pointers as ‘initial sequents’ for a proof in cycle normal form.
This result again shows the robustness of the definition of CΣn as a theory, and we would
further argue that, from the point of view of proof complexity, the backpointer-condition
induced by Prop. 7.4 above constitutes a better notion of ‘proof’ for CΣn. One could go yet
further and argue that an even better notion of ‘proof’ would allow pointers to any other
identical sequent in the proof (not just those below it), which could potentially make for an
exponential improvement in proof complexity.
At the same time we see that it is not easy to compare the proof complexity of such
systems for CΣn with those for IΣn+1, due to the fact that we have used a free-cut elimination
result for the simulations in both directions, inducing a possibly non-elementary blowup
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in proof size. It would be interesting if a more fine-grained result regarding the relative
proof complexity of IΣn+1 and CΣn could be established, but this is beyond the scope of
the current work.
8. Some metamathematical results
In this section we make some further observations on various properties of the cyclic theories
in this work, which are later applied in Sect. 9. The exposition we give is brief, since we
follow standard methods, but we provide appropriate references for the reader.
8.1. Provably recursive functions of C∆0. As a corollary of the Thms. 4.1 and 7.3 we
have that, for n ≥ 1, the provably recursive functions of CΣn coincide with those of IΣn+1.
Such functions were characterised by Parsons in [Par72] as certain fragments of Go¨del’s
system T or, equivalently, by recursion up to suitably bounded towers of ω, e.g. in [Bus95].
This apparently leaves open a gap for the case of C∆0 (a.k.a. CΣ0). However notice that
from the definition of CΣn and Thm. 4.1 we have:
Corollary 8.1 (of Thm. 4.1). CΣn is axiomatised by the Πn+1-consequences of IΣn+1, for
n ≥ 0.
In particular, since I∆0 is known to be Π1-axiomatised (see, e.g., Thm. 1.27 in [HP93]), we
have that in fact C∆0 ⊇ I∆0 (i.e. over all theorems). Thus C∆0 can prove recursive at least
the functions (bitwise computable) in the linear-time hierarchy, from the analogous result for
I∆0 (see, e.g., Theorem III.4.8 in [CN10]). Conversely, since C∆0 is also Π1-axiomatised by
the above observation, it has no more ‘computational content’ than I∆0, as we will now see.
Recall that the linear-time hierarchy (LTH) is the class of predicates expressible by a
∆0 formula in the language of arithmetic.
7 A function is said to be in FLTH just if it has
linear growth rate (in terms of the bit string representation) and is bitwise computable in
LTH.
Proposition 8.2. If C∆0 ` ∀~x.∃!y.ϕ(~x, y) for a Σ1-formula ϕ, then ϕ computes the graph
of a function in FLTH.
Proof sketch. Suppose ϕ is ∃~y.ϕ0 with ϕ0 ∈ ∆0. By ‘Parikh’s theorem’ for Π1-axiomatised
theories (see, e.g., Thm. III.2.3 in [CN10]) we moreover have C∆0 ` ∀~x.∃!y < t.∃~y < ~t.ϕ0
for some terms t,~t. This means we may simply search for a witness y < t of linear size
verifying ∃~y < ~t.ϕ0, an LTH property, and thus ∃~y < ~t.ϕ0 computes the graph of a function
in FLTH.
Interestingly, we cannot strengthen the above proposition to “C∆0 and I∆0 prove the
same Π2 theorems”. This is because IΣ1 proves the consistency of I∆0, a Π1 sentence, so
C∆0 does too by Thm. 4.1. Thus the aforementioned stronger statement would contradict
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for I∆0.
See, e.g., [Bus98, CN10] for further discussions on the provably recursive functions of
fragments of (bounded) arithmetic, and see, e.g., [CK02] for more details on relationships
between the language of arithmetic and recursive function classes.
7Equivalently it is the class of predicates recognised by an alternating Turing machine with random access
in a linear number of steps with only boundedly many alternations. See, e.g., [CK02] for more details.
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8.2. Failure of cut-admissibility. As a corollary of our results, we may formally conclude
that the cut rule is not admissible in CA, or indeed any of its fragments CΣn.
8 In fact the
situation is rather worse than that:
Corollary 8.3 (of Thms. 4.1 and 7.3). Let n ≥ 1. The class of CA proofs with only Σn−1
cuts is not complete for even the Π1 theorems of CΣn.
Proof. For a recursively axiomatised theory T , let Con(T ) be an appropriate Π1 sentence
expressing that “T does not prove 0 = 1”. It is well-known that IΣn+1 ` Con(IΣn) (see, e.g.,
[Kay91, Bus98, HP93]), so also CΣn ` Con(IΣn) by Thm. 4.1. For contradiction, suppose
Con(IΣn) concludes some CA proof with only Σn−1 cuts; then in fact CΣn−1 ` Con(IΣn)
by degeneralising (for the case n = 1) and the subformula property. However this implies
IΣn ` Con(IΣn) by Thm. 7.3, which is impossible by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem
for IΣn.
See, e.g., [Bus98, Kay91, HP93] for further discussions on the provability of consistency
principles for fragments of arithmetic.
8.3. Reflection and consistency. Thanks to the uniformity of the results from Sect. 6,
we can give some fundamental metalogical properties regarding provable soundness and
consistency of cyclic proofs. First we will fix our formalisation of CΣn-provability (of
arbitrary sequents, not just Σn) in the language of arithmetic.
Let n ≥ 0. We will fix some appropriate formula Prfn(pi, ϕ) expressing that pi is a
CΣn proof of ϕ. We suppose that proofs are written as usual derivations (finite trees or
dags) whose leaves are either axiom instances from Q, or otherwise some (possibly open) Σn
sequent labelled by an associated cyclic proof that derives it (containing only Σn formulae).
Descriptively, Prfn(x, y) checks that pi is a proof of ϕ by first checking that it is a well-formed
derivation, then checking that each premiss is either an axiom instance from Q or is labelled
by a correct cyclic proof deriving it. In the latter case it must search for a certificate verifying
that the cyclic proof satisfies the automaton-inclusion condition, i.e. that Ab v At.
While Prfn(pi, ϕ) is recursive in pi and ϕ, this may not be provably the case in weak
theories such as I∆0. Thus we fix Prfn to be an appropriate Σ1 formula, as described above,
and we write nϕ for ∃pi.Prfn(pi, ϕ). We write Πk-Rfn(CΣn) for the (local) Πk-reflection
principle of CΣn. I.e.
Πk-Rfn(CΣn) := {nϕ ⊃ ϕ : ϕ ∈ Πk}
Corollary 8.4 (of Thm. 6.9). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+2 ` Πn+1-Rfn(CΣn).
Proof. Let ϕ(~x) be a Σn formula. Working in IΣn+2, suppose that n∀~x.ϕ (so that CΣn `
∀~x.ϕ(~x)). We may assume that every formula occurring in a CΣn proof of the sequent
⇒ ϕ(~x) is Σn, thanks to free-cut elimination, Thm. 2.5 (recall that this result is provable
already in IΣ1). Thus we have N,∅ n+1 ∀~x.ϕ(~x) by Thm. 6.9 and Prop. 6.5.5, whence the
result follows by the reflection property, Prop. 6.6.
Notice that, while the statement of Cor. 8.4 above is peculiar to the current formulation of a
CΣn proof, Prfn, it holds also under any other notion of proof that is provably equivalent in
IΣn+2. In particular, in Sect. 7.1 we discussed another notion of proof for CΣn which, morally,
allowed “free cuts” to occur inside cycles. Since the equivalence of the two formulations,
8This observation was pointed out to me by Stefano Berardi.
Vol. 16:1 ON THE LOGICAL COMPLEXITY OF CYCLIC ARITHMETIC 1:25
Prop. 7.4, is proved using only free-cut elimination and basic reasoning, all formalisable in
IΣ1, the version of Cor. 8.4 for that more liberal notion of a CΣn proof holds too.
As usual, we may see Π1-reflection as another formulation of ‘consistency’. Let us write
Con(CΣn) for the sentence ¬n0 = 1 (notice that this is a Π1 sentence).
Corollary 8.5 (of Thm. 6.9). For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+2 ` Con(CΣn)
Proof. Follows immediately from Cor. 8.4 above by substituting 0 = 1 for ϕ.
We will see in the next subsection that this result is, in fact, optimal with respect to logical
complexity.
8.4. Incompleteness. Unsurprisingly, all the theories CΣn suffer from Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems. Even though CΣn is not explicitly defined axiomatically, it does have a
recursively enumerable notion of provability, namely n, and so must be incomplete with
respect to this notion (see, e.g., Thm. 2.21 in [HP93]):
Theorem 8.6 (Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, for cyclic theories). For n ≥ 0, as
long as CΣn is consistent (i.e. CΣn 0 0 = 1), we have CΣn 0 Con(CΣn).
Consequently we have that Cor. 8.5 is, in fact, optimal in terms of logical complexity:
Corollary 8.7. For n ≥ 0, we have IΣn+1 0 Con(CΣn).
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then also CΣn ` Con(CΣn) by Π1-conservativity, cf. Thm. 4.1,
which contradicts Go¨del’s second incompleteness above, Thm. 8.6.
We will see in the next section that this has a curious consequence for the reverse mathematics
of results in ω-automaton theory.
9. On the logical strength of McNaughton’s theorem
In this section we show how the results of this work yield an unexpected corollary: certain
formulations of McNaugton’s theorem, that every NBA has an equivalent deterministic
‘parity’ or ‘Muller’ automaton, are not provable in RCA0. The general question of the logical
strength of McNaughton’s theorem was notably left open in the recent work [KMPS19].
Our result is non-uniform in the sense that unprovability holds for any explicit primitive
recursive determinisation construction. As far as the author is aware this accounts for all
known proofs of McNaughton’s theorem, suggesting that it is unlikely to be provable at
all, in its usual uniform version, in RCA0. That said, we point out that the statement
of McNaughton’s theorem itself is arguably not so well-defined in the context of reverse
mathematics: it is not clear in RCA0 that different versions of the theorem coincide, namely
with respect to the choice of (a) acceptance conditions (parity, Muller, etc.) and (b)
formulation of the set of states infinitely often hit during a run (negative, ∀, vs. positive, ∃).
Our argument is based on an alternative route to proving the soundness of CΣn.
Assuming that an appropriate version of McNaughton’s theorem is indeed provable in RCA0,
we are in fact able to formalise the soundness argument for CΣn already in IΣn+1. However,
consequently we have that IΣn+1 proves the consistency of CΣn, and so CΣn proves its
own consistency by Π1-conservativity, cf. Thm. 4.1, which is absurd by Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem for CΣn, Thm. 8.6.
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9.1. Deterministic parity automata and universality. Due to space considerations,
we only briefly present the details of parity automata. The reader is encouraged to consult,
e.g., [Tho97], for further details on automaton theory for ω-languages.
A (non-deterministic) Rabin or parity automaton (NRA) is a just a NBA where,
instead of a set of final states F , we have a function c : Q→ N, called a colouring. A word
is accepted by a NRA if it has a run in which the least colour of a state occurring infinitely
often is even. The notion of deterministic parity automaton (DRA) is analogous to that of a
DBA, i.e. requiring the transition relation to be deterministic and total.
Theorem 9.1 McNaughton, [McN66]. For every NBA A, we can effectively construct a
DRA accepting the same language.
Actually, McNaughton gave this result for deterministic Muller automata rather than parity
automata. The equivalence of these two models is well-known though, as we previously
mentioned, it is not clear whether RCA0 can prove their equivalence. The fact that we use
parity automata here is arbitrary; we believe a similar exposition could be carried out for
Muller automata.
As for DBA, we may naturally express language acceptance for a DRA A = (A,Q, δ, q0, c)
by an arithmetical formula, i.e. without SO quantifiers. For our purposes, it will be useful
to take a ‘negative’ formulation of acceptance:
X ∈ L(A) := ∀q ∈ Q.
(( ∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x′) = q
∧ ∃x.∀x′ > x. c(qX(x′)) ≥ c(q)
)
⊃ “c(q) is even”
)
We write σ : q1
∗→
δ
q2 if a word σ ∈ A∗ determines a path along δ starting at q1 and
ending at q2. We write
+→
δ
when the path is nonempty. A simple loop about a state q ∈ Q is
a nonempty path along δ beginning and ending at q that visits no intermediate state more
than once.
Recall that we call an ω-automaton universal if it accepts all ω-words over its alphabet.
We write Univ(A) for a standard recursive procedure testing universality of a DRA A: “for
every odd-coloured state q reachable from q0, any simple loop about q contains a state
coloured by an even number < c(q)”. More formally, writing σ′ ≤ σ if σ′ is a prefix of σ:
Univ(A) :=
∀q ∗←
δ
q0. ∀σ : q +→
δ
q.(
“σ is a simple loop” ∧ “c(q) is odd”
⊃ ∃σ′ ≤ σ. ∃q′ ∈ Q. (σ′ : q +→
δ
q′ ∧ “c(q′) even” ∧ c(q′) < c(q))
)
Clearly this formula is provably ∆01 in RCA0. Furthermore:
Proposition 9.2. RCA0 ` ∀ DRA A. (Univ(A) ≡ ∀X ∈ Aω.X ∈ L(A)).
Proof. Working in RCA0, let A = (A,Q, δ, q0, c) be a DRA. For the left-right implication,
suppose there is some X ∈ Aω such that X /∈ L(A). Thus we have some q ∈ Q such that
c(q) is odd and the following hold:
∀x.∃x′ > x. qX(x′) = q (9.1)
∃x.∀x′ > x. c(qX(x′)) ≥ c(q) (9.2)
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Let x0 be a witness to (9.2), and let x0 < x1 < x2 such that qX(x1) = qX(x2) = q, by two
applications of (9.1). We will need the following intermediate (arithmetical) result,
If σ : q
+→
δ
q, there is a subsequence σ′ of σ that is a simple loop on q.
which follows directly by induction on |σ|, eliminating intermediate loops at each inductive
step in the case of non-simplicity. Now we apply this result to the sequence (X(x))x2x=x1 to
obtain a simple loop about q; moreover since this will be a subsequence of (X(x))x2x=x1 , we
have that any even-coloured state occurring in it is coloured > c(q), since x0 witnesses (9.2)
and x0 < x1 < x2, so ¬Univ(A).
For the right-left implication, we proceed again by contraposition. Suppose ¬Univ(A),
and let σ : q0
∗→
δ
q and τ : q
+→
δ
q such that c(q) is odd, and τ is a simple loop containing no
states coloured < c(q). We may now set X = στω (which is easily defined by comprehension)
and show that X /∈ L(A). For this it suffices to show (9.1) and (9.2) above. For the former,
given x we set x′ = |σ| + m|τ | > x, for some sufficiently large m. For the latter, we set
x = |σ| as the witness to the outer existential, whence (9.2) follows by construction of τ .
9.2. Reducing soundness of C∆0 to a version of McNaughton’s theorem. Hence-
forth we may write L(A) = L(B) as shorthand for ∀X.(X ∈ L(A) ≡ X ∈ L(B)), where A
and B may be any type of automaton thus far encountered with respect to their associated
notions of membership. Based on our ‘negative’ formulation of DRA acceptance, we define
for a (definable) function d:
McNaughton−d := ∀ NBA A.(“d(A) is a DRA” ∧ L(A) = L(d(A))
Assuming this is provable in RCA0 for some primitive recursive function d, we will
reproduce a version of Thm. 6.3 in IΣn+1. The idea is that, rather than expressing the fact
that L(A1) ⊆ L(A2) by saying “(Ac1 unionsq A2)c is empty”, as we did in Sects. 6 and 7, we may
rather express it as “Ac1 unionsq A2 is universal”, relying on McNaughton−d and Prop. 9.2 above.
For a DBA A1 and a NBA A2 we define A1 vd A2 as Univ(d(Ac1 unionsq A2))). Let us write
(6.3d) for the equation (6.3) with v replaced by vd, i.e.:
∀ DBA A1,∀ NBA A2. ((A1 vd A2 ∧X ∈ L(A1)) ⊃ ArAcc(X,A2)) (6.3d)
We have the following analogue to Thm. 6.3:
Proposition 9.3. RCA0 + McNaughton
−
d ` (6.3d).
Proof. Mimicking the proof of Thm. 6.3, we work in RCA0 and suppose X ∈ L(A1) and
A1 vd A2. We have:
Univ(d(Ac1 unionsq A2)) since A1 vd A2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.Y ∈ L(Ac1 unionsq A2) by Prop. 9.2 and McNaughton−d
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(Ac1) ∨ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 5.6.2
=⇒ ∀Y ∈ Aω.(Y ∈ L(A1) ⊃ Y ∈ L(A2)) by Lemma 5.6.4
=⇒ X ∈ L(A2) since X ∈ L(A1)
=⇒ ArAcc(X,A2) by Prop. 6.2.
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We may use this result to reconstruct the entire formalised soundness argument for CΣn
of Sect. 6 in IΣn+1 instead of IΣn+2, assuming McNaughton
−
d . In particular, using Prop. 9.3
above instead of Thm. 6.3, we may recover versions of Cor. 6.4, Thm. 6.9 and Cor. 8.4 for
IΣn+1 instead of IΣn+2, with respect to (6.3d) instead of (6.3). Formally, let Πk-Rfnd(CΣn)
denote the formulation of the Πk-reflection principle for CΣn induced by using vd instead
of v throughout Sect. 8.3, with respect to the definitions of Prfn and n. Similarly, let
Cond(CΣn) be the induced consistency principle.
Proposition 9.4. For n ≥ 0, if RCA0 ` McNaughton−d for some primitive recursive function
d, then IΣn+1 ` Πn+1-Rfnd(CΣn), so in particular IΣn+1 ` Cond(CΣn).
Proof sketch. The argument goes through just like that of Cors. 8.4 and 8.5 of Thm. 6.9,
except that we use Prop. 9.3 instead of Thm. 6.3. Appealing to the assumption that
RCA0 ` McNaughton−d , this version of the argument requires only Σ01-IND instead of Σ02-IND,
thus yielding IΣn+1 proofs overall once we substitute the appropriate formulae for X.
Theorem 9.5. RCA0 0 McNaughton−d , for any primitive recursive function d.
Proof sketch. The same argument as Cor. 8.7 holds for our revised notion of consistency;
in particular we have that IΣ1 0 Cond(C∆0). The result now follows immediately by the
contraposition of Prop. 9.4 above, for n = 0.
10. Conclusions and further remarks
In this work we developed the theory of cyclic arithmetic by studying the logical complexity
of its proofs. We showed that inductive and cyclic proofs of the same theorems require similar
logical complexity, and obtained tight quantifier complexity bounds in both directions. We
further showed that the proof complexity of the two frameworks differs only elementarily,
although it remains unclear how to properly measure proof complexity for the fragments
CΣn, even if the theory itself seems well-defined and robust. Many of these issues constitute
avenues for further work.
10.1. Comparison to the proofs of [BT17b] and [Sim17]. One reason for our improved
quantifier complexity compared to [Sim17], is that Simpson rather relies on Weak Ko¨nig’s
Lemma (WKL) to obtain an infinite branch when formalising the soundness argument for
cyclic proofs. This, a priori, increases quantifier complexity of the argument, since WKL is
known to be unprovable in RCA0 even in the presence of Σ
0
2-IND; in fact, it is incomparable
to Σ02-IND (see, e.g., [KMPS19]). That said, we believe that the ‘bounded-width WKL’
(bwWKL) of [KMPS19] should suffice to carry out Simpson’s proof, and this principle is
provable already in RCA0 + Σ
0
2-IND. Applying this strategy to his proof yields only that
CΣn ⊆ IΣn+3, since bwWKL is applied to a Π0n+1 set, though this should improve to a IΣn+2
bound by using the non-uniform version of NBA complementation implicit in [KMPS19],
cf. Prop. 7.1. We reiterate that the main improvement here is in giving a uniform formulation
of those results; not only does this lead to a better proof complexity result, cf. Thm. 6.10,
but we also recover a metamathematical account of the theories CΣn, cf. 8.
Berardi and Tatsuta’s approach, [BT17b], is rather interesting since it is arguably
more ‘structural’ in nature, relying on proof-level manipulations rather than reflection
principles. That said there are still crucial sources of logical complexity blowup, namely
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in an ‘arithmetical’ version of Ramsey’s theorem (Thm. 5.2) and the consequent Podelski-
Rybalchenko termination theorem (Thm. 6.1). Both of these apparently increase quantifier
complexity by several levels, and so their approach does not seem to yield comparable logical
bounds to this work. Since proof complexity is not a primary consideration of their work, it
is not simple to track the precise bounds in [BT17b]. There are some apparent sources of
exponential blowups,9 though it seems that the global simulation is elementary. As before,
we reiterate that the major improvement in the present work is in the uniformity of our
exposition: the approach of [BT17b] is fundamentally non-uniform so does not yield any
metamathematical account of cyclic arithmetic.
10.2. On the correctness criteria for cyclic proofs. Since the algorithms used to check
correctness of a cyclic preproof reduce to the inclusion of Bu¨chi automata, the exponential
simulation of CA by PA is optimal, unless there is a nondeterministic subexponential-time
algorithm for PSPACE or, more interestingly, there is an easier way to check cyclic proof
correctness. (In fact, technically, it would suffice to have an easier criterion for a larger class
of preproofs that were, nonetheless, sound.) As far as we know, PSPACE remains the best
known upper bound for checking the correctness of general cyclic preproofs, although efficient
algorithms have recently been proposed for less general correctness criteria, cf. [Str17, NST18].
Thus, it would be interesting to prove a corresponding lower bound or otherwise improve the
upper bound. Conditional such results could be obtained via, say, certain polynomial upper
bounds on proof complexity in CA: for instance, if CA were to have polynomial-size proofs
of each correct Bu¨chi inclusion then cyclic proof correctness would not be polynomial-time
checkable, unless NP = PSPACE. Unfortunately na¨ıve attempts at this approach fail, but
the general question of whether PA and CA are exponentially separated seems pertinent.
On the other hand, the translation of Lemma 4.2 from inductive proofs to cyclic proofs
is rather structured. In light of the converse result in Sect. 6 it might make sense in further
work, from the point of view of logical complexity, to consider only cyclic proofs accepted by
some weaker more efficiently verified criterion, such as [Str17, NST18].
10.3. Interpreting ordinary inductive definitions in arithmetic. In earlier work by
Brotherston and Simpson, cyclic proofs were rather considered over a system of FO logic
extended by ‘ordinary’ Martin-Lo¨f inductive definitions [ML71], known as FOLID [Bro06,
BS07, BS11]. Berardi and Tatsuta showed in [BT17b] that the cyclic system CLKIDω for
FOLID is equivalent to the inductive system LKID, when at least arithmetic is present,
somewhat generalising Simpson’s result [Sim17]. We point out that ordinary Martin-Lo¨f
inductive definitions can be interpreted in arithmetic in the usual way by a Σ1 inductive
construction of ‘approximants’, and a proof of CLKIDω may be similarly interpreted line-
by-line in CA. (This is similar to the role of the ‘stage number predicates’ in [BT17b].) In
particular, this means that CLKIDω(+PA) is conservative over CA. We reiterate that the
interest behind the results of [BT17b] is rather the structural nature of the transformations,
but this observation also exemplifies why CA is a natural and canonical object of study, as
argued in [Sim17].
9For instance, Lemma 8.4 in that work yields a set of apparently exponential size in the worst case, and
this bounds from below the size of the overall translation, e.g. as in Lemma 8.7.
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10.4. Cyclic propositional proof complexity. One perspective gained from this work
comes in the setting of propositional proof complexity (see, e.g., [CN10, Kra95]). Thm. 4.1
of Sect. 4 should relativise to theories with oracles too. For instance, we may formalise in
C∆0(f), where f is a fresh (uninterpreted) function symbol, a proof of the relativised version
of the (finitary) pigeonhole principle (see App. A). This formula is known to be unprovable
in I∆0(f) due to lower bounds on propositional proofs of bounded depth [KPW95, PBI93].
At the same time the ‘Paris-Wilkie’ translation [PW81], which fundamentally links
I∆0(f) to bounded-depth propositional proofs, works locally on an arithmetic proof, at
the level of formulae. Consequently one may still apply the translation to the lines of a
C∆0(f) proof to obtain small ‘proof-like’ objects containing only formulae of bounded depth,
and a cyclic proof structure. One would expect that this corresponds to some strong form
of ‘extension’, since it is known that adding usual extension to bounded systems already
yields full ‘extended Frege’ proofs. However at the same time, some of this power has been
devolved to the proof structure rather than simply at the level of the formula, and so could
yield insights into how to prove simulations between fragments of Hilbert-Frege systems
with extension.
We point out that recent work, [AL18], relating cyclic proof structures to proof complexity
has already appeared, albeit with a different correctness criterion.
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Appendix A. Case study: the relativised pigeonhole principle
In this section we will give an example of the translation from Sect. 4 in a relativised setting.
Simpson already gave an example of a separation between CΣ1 and IΣ1 via the totality of
the Ackermann-Pe´ter function [Sim17], a Π2 sentence. Logically simpler Π1 separations are
obtainable in the form of consistency principles, as we discussed in Sect. 8.
In this section we consider the well-known pigeonhole principle, defined by the following
FO formula with an uninterpreted function symbol f :
PHP(f) := ∀n.(∀x ≤ n.f(x) < n ⊃ ∃x ≤ n.∃x′ < x.f(x) = f(x′))
It is well-known that I∆0(f) does not prove PHP(f), due to lower bounds on proposi-
tional proofs of bounded depth [KPW95, PBI93]. On the other hand, by relativising the
constructions in Sect. 4, it is provable in C∆0(f) thanks to the known simple proofs in
IΣ1(f).
A.1. A simple proof of PHP(f) in IΣ1(f). First we recall a simple well-known proof of
PHP(f) in IΣ1(X). In fact, as in Sect. 4, we will work with Π1-IND rather than Σ1-IND.
Temporarily, let us write A,B for first-order variables that we interpret as the codes of
finite sets. For such codes we may use set-theoretic symbols such as ∈ and \ with their usual
interpretations, with the understanding that their basic properties are provable in I∆0.
Lemma A.1. IΣ1(f) proves the following:
∀A,B.(|A| > |B| ⊃ (∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B ⊃ ∃x, x′ ∈ A.(x 6= x′ ∧ f(x) = f(x′)))) (A.1)
Proof. Working in IΣ1(f), we reason by induction on |B|. If B is empty and |A| > |B| then
A is nonempty and so (A.1) is vacuously true by falsity of the premiss.
Otherwise B is nonempty, so let b ∈ B and let |A| > |B|.
• If ∃x ∈ A.f(x) = b then, let a ∈ A such that f(a) = b.
– If ∃x ∈ A.(x′ 6= a ∧ f(x′) = b) then we are done.
– Otherwise suppose ∀x ∈ A.(f(x) = b ⊃ x = a). Then we have ∀x ∈ A \ {a}.f(x) ∈
B \ {b}. Since we still have that |A \ {a}| > |B \ {b} we may conclude by the inductive
hypothesis.
• Otherwise ∀x ∈ A.f(x) 6= b, so in fact ∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B \ {b} and still |A| > |B \ {b}.
Hence we conclude by the inductive hypothesis.
From here there is a simple proof of (A.1) ⊃ PHP(f) in I∆0(f), by instantiating A and
B as [0, n] and [0, n) resp. Thus we have that IΣ1(f) ` PHP(f).
A.2. A proof of PHP(f) in C∆0(f). To show that C∆0(f) ` PHP(f) it suffices to give
C∆0(f) proofs of Lemma A.1. The remainder of the argument may be carried out in I∆0(f),
and so also in C∆0(f) by Prop. 3.7,
Lemma A.2. C∆0(f) ` (A.1).
Proof. As abbreviations, let us write f(A) ⊆ B for ∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ B and Injf (A) for
∀x, x′ ∈ A.(f(x) = f(x′) ⊃ x = x′). We give an appropriate derivation in Fig. 2, mimicking
the argument of Lemma A.1 under Lemma 4.2, where pi0 is a I∆0(f) proof of B = ∅, |A| >
|B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) and pi1 is a proof of a′ ∈ A, a′ 6= a, f(a′) = b, a ∈ A, f(a) = b, b ∈
B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A).
1
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pi0
... •|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
sub |A \ {a}| > |B \ {b}|, f(A \ {a}) ⊆ B \ {b} ⇒ ¬Injf (A \ {a})
∀x ∈ A.(f(x) = b ⊃ x = a), a ∈ A, f(a) = b, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) pi1
a ∈ A, f(a) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
... •|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
sub |A| > |B \ {b}|, f(A) ⊆ B \ {b} ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
∀x ∈ A.¬f(x) = b, b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)
b ∈ B, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) •|A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A)⊃,∀⇒ ∀A,B.(|A| > |B| ⊃ (f(A) ⊆ B ⊃ ¬Injf (A)))
Figure 2: A C∆0(f) proof of PHP(f), where pi0 is a I∆0(f) proof of B = ∅, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A) and pi1 is a proof of
a′ ∈ A, a′ 6= a, f(a′) = b, a ∈ A, f(a) = b, |A| > |B|, f(A) ⊆ B ⇒ ¬Injf (A).
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Appendix B. Non-uniform complementation of Bu¨chi automata
In this section we give a self-contained proof of Prop. 7.1, which is only implicit in [KMPS19].
One novel contribution here is a much simpler proof of the (Nonuniform) Additive Ramsey
Theorem. The remainder of the complementation argument is standard and follows closely
[KMPS19], though we present it here with more structure and proof details.
B.1. Nonuniform Additive Ramsey Theorem in RCA0. Let us write
(N
2
)
for the set
of unordered pairs of natural numbers. We in fact write its elements as ordered pairs (i, j)
where always i < j.
Let (S, •) be a finite semigroup and consider a ‘colouring’ C : (N2)→ S. We may omit
the group operation symbol • when composing elements of S. We say that C is additive
if, whenever i < j < k, we have C(i, j)C(j, k) = C(i, k). We say that I ⊆ N is an a-clique
(under C) if, ∀i, j ∈ I we have C(i, j) = a.
Theorem B.1 (Nonuniform Additive Ramsey Theorem). Let (S, •) be a finite semigroup.
Then:
RCA0 ` ∀C :
(
N
2
)
→ S.(“C is additive” ⊃ ∃a ∈ S.∃I ⊆ N.“I is an infinite a-clique”)
Before we give the proof, we better state the following fact:
Fact B.2 (Nonuniform Infinite Pigeonhole Principle). Let S be a finite set. Then:
RCA0 ` ∀f : N→ S.∃a ∈ S.∀m.∃x > m.f(x) = a
In particular:
RCA0 ` ∀f : N→ S. ∃Y infinite. ∀x, y ∈ Y. f(x) = f(y)
This result is well-known in reverse mathematics and can be proved by a routine meta-level
induction on the size of S. The second display follows from the first part by ∆01-CA.
We can now give a proof of the Nonuniform Additive Ramsey Theorem. This argu-
ment differs from and is somewhat simpler than the analogous argument from [KMPS19]
(Prop. 4.1), which requires a detour via the Ordered Ramsey Theorem and ‘Green’ theory.
In particular, since we only care about nonuniform provability here, we are not conerned
about the quantifier complexity of the inductive invariant, since this induction will take
place at the meta-level.
Proof of Thm. B.1. We proceed by a meta-level induction on the size of S. If S is empty
the statement is vacuously true, so we proceed to the inductive step.
If for some a ∈ S there are only finitely many i such that C(i, j) = a for some j > i.
Then, letting n be such that C(i, j) 6= a for i, j ≥ n, we may simply apply the inductive
hypothesis to the colouring C(·+ n, ·+ n). Thus we may assume henceforth that:
∀a ∈ S.∃∞i ∈ N.∃j > i.C(i, j) = a (B.1)
Now, suppose that for some a ∈ S we have aS ( S. We will define, assuming the above
display, a certain ‘increasing’ enumeration of elements of
(N
2
)
that map to a. Consider the
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functions i : N→ N and j : N→ N defined simultaneously as follows:
i(0) := β0µk.(k = 〈i′, j′〉 ∧ j′ > i′ ∧ C(i′, j′) = a)
i(n+ 1) := β0µk.(k = 〈i′, j′〉 ∧ j′ > i′ > j(n) ∧ C(i′, j′) = a)
j(0) := µj′ > i(0).C(i(0), j′) = a
j(n+ 1) := µj′ > i(n+ 1).C(i(n+ 1), j′) = a
where we write µx.ϕ(x) for the least x such that ϕ(x). Notice that this definition is a form
of simultaneous primitive recursion with provably terminating blind searches, assuming
Eqn. (B.1), so i and j are provably recursive and their defining equations above are provable
(in RCA0 + (B.1)). Thus we have that for all n ∈ N:
i(n) < j(n) < i(n+ 1)
C(i(n), j(n)) = a
But now, for m < n, notice that,
C(i(m), i(n)) = C(i(m), j(m))C(j(m), i(n))
= aC(j(m), i(n))
∈ aS ( S
by the additivity property and assumption. So from here we may apply the inductive
hypothesis to the colouring C(i(·), i(·)) and conclude. Thus we may henceforth assume that:
∀a ∈ S.aS = S (B.2)
In other words, a • · is a bijection on S, for any a ∈ S. Thus we have the left cancellation
property: if ab = ac then b = c, and for any a there is a unique b ∈ S such that ab = a.
Now, C(0, ·) must take some value a ∈ S infinitely often, by the non-uniform infinite
pigeonhole principle, Fact B.2. In this case we may simply set I = {i : C(0, i) = a}. Notice
that, for i, j ∈ I with i < j, we have a = C(0, j) = C(0, i)C(i, j) = aC(i, j), and so indeed
each C(i, j) is identical, by left-cancellation.
B.2. Characterising rejection via the Ramseyan factorisation of ω-words. For the
remainder of this section let us fix an NBA A = (A,Q, δ, q0, F ).
Since we deal with non-deterministic automata, it no longer makes sense to use the
notation σ : q
∗→
δ
q′ from Sect. 9, since there may be several paths through δ from q to q′
following σ. Instead, for σ ∈ A∗, we write:
x : q
σ→
δ
q′ := “x is a path through δ from q to q′ following σ”
Now, for each finite word σ ∈ A∗ we may consider its transition matrix δ(σ), which
is the graph whose nodes are those of Q with an edge from q to q′ if there exists some
x : q
σ→
δ
q′. The edge is labelled with ∞ if there is such a path that hits an accepting state
(after q). We construe such graphs as functions of type Q×Q→ {0, 1,∞} in the natural
way. Let us call the set of all such graphs δ(A∗), which we note must be finite. Notice that
δ : A∗ → (Q×Q→ {0, 1,∞}) is provably recursive in RCA0 by the following definition:
δ(σ)(q, q′) =

0 @x : q σ→
δ
q′
∞ ∃x : q σ→
δ
q′.∃i < |x|.x(i) ∈ F
1 otherwise
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We may compose such graphs by a variation of the usual relational composition ac-
counting for the labelling in a natural way: for β, γ : Q × Q → {0, 1,∞}, we define
βγ : Q×Q→ {0, 1,∞} by:
(βγ)(q, q′) = max
p∈Q
(
β(q, p) · γ(p, q′))
Here we define max and · as expected, in particular setting 0 · ∞ = 0 =∞ · 0. Intuitively,
this is just the same as relational composition, only recording if it is possible to hit a
final state en route. Under these operations we have that δ is in fact a homomorphism
A∗ → (Q×Q→ {0, 1,∞}), provably in RCA0:
Proposition B.3. RCA0 ` ∀σ, τ ∈ A∗.δ(στ) = δ(σ)δ(τ).
The proof follows by a straightforward induction on the length of τ . Only the base case
when τ is some a ∈ A is interesting, with the inductive case following by associativity of
word composition.
Now, for β, γ : Q×Q→ {0, 1,∞}, let us say that the pair (β, γ) is rejecting if:
(1) βγ = β; and,
(2) γγ = γ; and,
(3) ∀q ∈ Q.(β(q0, q) > 0 ⊃ γ(q, q) <∞)
Again, the property of being rejecting pair is clearly ∆01, since we have fixed Q in advance
so there are only finitely many cases to consider. Let us adopt the interval notation [i, j] for
the set {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} and [i, j) for the set {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1}. For an infinite sequence X
we also write X[i, j] and X[i, j) for the finite subsequences (X(i), X(i+ 1), . . . , X(j)) and
(X(i), X(i+ 1), . . . , X(j − 1)) respectively.
Lemma B.4 (Ramseyan factorisation (in RCA0)). For any X ∈ Aω, there are β, γ ∈ δ(A∗)
and an infinite set I ⊆ N such that:
(1) δ(X[0, i)) = β, for i ∈ I.
(2) δ(X[i, j)) = γ, for i, j ∈ I with i < j.
Moreover, for any such β, γ, I satisfiying (1) and (2) above, we have that:
(3) (β, γ) is a rejecting pair if and only if X /∈ L(A).
Proof. Working inside RCA0, let C :
(N
2
) → δ(A∗) by C(i, j) = δ(X[i, j)). By Prop. B.3
we have that C is an additive colouring, and thus we may apply the Nonuniform Additive
Ramsey Theorem, Thm. B.1, to obtain some infinite set I0 with γ = C(i, j), for all i, j ∈ I0
with i < j, yielding (2). Now, for an arbitrary i0 ∈ I0 we may set I = {i ∈ I0 : i > i0}.
Notice that, now, C(0, i) = C(0, i0)C(i0, i) = C(0, i0)γ, so we may set β = C(0, i) for
some/any i ∈ I, yielding (1).
For (3), first suppose (β, γ) is a rejecting pair and let Y ∈ Qω be a run of A on X. We
will show that Y cannot be accepting. By the Non-Uniform Infinite Pigeonhole Principle,
Fact B.2, there is some q ∈ Q and some infinite subset I ′ ⊆ I such that Y (i) = q for each
i ∈ I ′. We claim that, for any i, j ∈ I ′ and k ∈ N such that i < k < j, we have that qk /∈ F .
For this notice that:
• β(q0, q) > 0 since Y [0, i] : q0 X[0,i)−→
δ
q.
• γ(q, q) <∞ since (β, γ) is a rejecting pair.
So, if qk lies on the path Y [i, j] : q
X[i,j)−→
δ
q, we must have that qk /∈ F , appealing to Prop. B.3.
Thus, for any i ∈ I ′, we have that ∀k > i.Y (k) /∈ F , and so Y is not an accepting run.
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Now, suppose that (β, γ) is not a rejecting pair and, by definition, let q be such that
β(q0, q) > 0 and γ(q, q) = ∞. We may enumerate infinite sets in RCA0 so let I = (ij)j∈N.
We may now simply define an accepting run Y of A on X by recursive comprehension by
insisting that,
• in the interval [0, i0), Y follows the ‘least’ path through δ from q0 to q; and,
• in the interval [ij , ij+1), Y follows the ‘least’ path through δ from q to q hitting a final
state.
Such paths must exist since (β, γ) is not a rejecting pair, and the set of all paths of bounded
length may be enumerated in RCA0. By construction, Y is accepting.
B.3. The complement NBA and proof of correctness. Now we are ready to define
the complement automaton of A, which simply guesses a rejecting Ramseyan factorisation
of an input ω-word:
Definition B.5. We define the NBA Ac = (A,Qc, δc, qc0, F c) as follows:
• Qc = {q0} ∪ δ(A∗) ∪ δ(A∗)2 ∪ δ(A∗)3.
• δc consists of the following transitions:
– (q0, a, (β, γ, δ(a)), for each rejecting pair (β, γ).
– ((β, γ, ζ), a, (β, γ, ζδ(a)))
– ((β, γ, ζ), a, γ) if ζδ(a) = β.
– (γ, a, (γ, δ(a))).
– ((γ, ζ), a, (γ, ζδ(a))).
– ((γ, ζ), a, γ) if ζδ(a) = γ.
– (γ, a, γ) if δ(a) = γ.
• qc0 = q0.
• F c = δ(A∗).
Now we are ready to prove the non-uniform complementation result.
Proof of Prop. 7.1. By Lemma B.4, it suffices to show that Ac accepts an ω-word just if has
a Ramseyan factorisation that is rejecting. Let us proceed working inside RCA0.
First, suppose X ∈ Aω with X /∈ L(A) and let β, γ, I be obtained from Lemma B.4.
Again we may enumerate I = (ij)j∈N. Define the run Y of X on Ac as follows:
• Y (0) = q0 and Y (1) = (β, γ, δ(X(0)));
• in the interval [1, i0), Y follows the (unique) transitions of the form ((β, γ, ζ), a, (β, γ, ζδ(a)));
• Y (ij) = γ, for all j ∈ N;
• in an interval (ij , ij+1), Y follows the (unique) transitions of the form ((γ, ζ), a, (γ, ζδ(a))).
Y is clearly recursive and so is indeed definable by ∆01-CA. Moreover, Y hits the final state
γ infinitely often (at each ij ∈ I), so Y is an accepting run for X on Ac.
Conversely, supposeX ∈ L(Ac) and let Y be an accepting run with Y (1) = (β, γ, δ(X(0))).
By a routine induction, Y must hit γ infinitely often, since that is the only state in δ(A∗)
that can ever be hit. Thus, by ∆01-CA, we have an infinite set I = {i ∈ N : Y (i) = γ}, which
we again enumerate I = (ij)j∈N. We may now show the properties (1) and (2) of Lemma B.4
with respect to the β, γ, I thus defined by induction. More precisely, we prove by induction
on i ∈ N that Y (i) has the following form:
• q0, if i = 0;
• (β, γ, δ(X[0, i))), if i < i0;
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• γ, if i ∈ I;
• (γ, δ(X[ij , i))) if ij < i < ij+1.
Properties (1) and (2) from Lemma B.4 now follow as special cases. Since (β, γ) was a
rejecting pair, by definition of Ac, we have from Lemma B.4.(3) that A rejects X. This
concludes the proof.
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